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Risky intertemporal choice is a fairly new topic in the realm of behavioral economics that 
involves examining the interactions between individuals’ time and risk preferences.  Previous 
research has looked at the gains and mixed domain, but little to no research has been done in the loss 
domain.  This study aims to fill this gap by examining how people respond to risky gambles in the 
loss domain given real world time delays.  The thesis focuses on changes in attitudes towards risk 
caused by temporal distance rather than how people discount risky prospects. Based on Construal 
Level Theory we predict that there will be a greater focus on outcomes over probabilities in delayed 
gambles compared to immediate ones, and hence, individuals will become more risk-averse for 
delayed gambles that are in the loss domain.  We conducted two experiments to test this prediction.  
Results revealed that while subjects in the immediate resolution group were significantly more risk-
seeking than future resolution groups in both experiments, the difference in risk attitudes between two 





I would like to thank my supervisor, Professor Selçuk Onay, for his guidance and support throughout 
the thesis.  I would also like to thank my two readers, Professor Vanessa Bohns and Professor 




I dedicate this thesis to my family who have always stood by me and supported me in all my 
endeavours.  Thank you for always being there. 
 
 vi 
Table of Contents 
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION ............................................................................................................... ii 
Abstract ................................................................................................................................................. iii 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................................... iv 
Dedication .............................................................................................................................................. v 
Table of Contents .................................................................................................................................. vi 
List of Figures ....................................................................................................................................... ix 
List of Tables ......................................................................................................................................... x 
Chapter 1 Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2 Literature Review .................................................................................................................. 4 
2.1 Risky Choice ................................................................................................................................ 4 
2.1.1 Expected Utility Theory ........................................................................................................ 4 
2.1.2 Prospect Theory .................................................................................................................... 7 
2.2 Intertemporal Choice ................................................................................................................... 9 
2.2.1 Discounted Utility Theory .................................................................................................. 10 
2.2.2 Construal Level Theory ...................................................................................................... 12 
Chapter 3 Risky Intertemporal Choice ................................................................................................. 15 
3.1 Risky Intertemporal Choice ....................................................................................................... 15 
3.2 Gains Domain ............................................................................................................................ 15 
3.3 Mixed Domain ........................................................................................................................... 19 
3.4 Gains and Loss Domain ............................................................................................................. 20 
3.5 Implications of Construal Level Theory .................................................................................... 22 
3.6 Overview .................................................................................................................................... 25 
Chapter 4 Hypothesis and Experimental Design ................................................................................. 26 
 
 vii 
4.1 Hypothesis .................................................................................................................................. 26 
4.2 Overview of the Studies ............................................................................................................. 26 
4.3 Experiment 1 .............................................................................................................................. 27 
4.3.1 Design and Procedure .......................................................................................................... 27 
4.4 Results ........................................................................................................................................ 29 
4.4.1 Overview Results – Experiment 1 ....................................................................................... 29 
4.4.2 Choice Question Results – Experiment 1 ............................................................................ 32 
4.4.3 Rating Question Results – Experiment 1 ............................................................................. 33 
4.5 Discussion – Experiment 1 ......................................................................................................... 35 
4.6 Experiment 2 .............................................................................................................................. 37 
4.6.1 Design and Procedure .......................................................................................................... 37 
4.7 Results ........................................................................................................................................ 38 
4.7.1 Overview Results – Experiment 2 ....................................................................................... 38 
4.8 Certainty Equivalent Results – Experiment 2 ............................................................................. 41 
4.9 Discussion – Experiment 2 ......................................................................................................... 43 
Chapter 5 Conclusions .......................................................................................................................... 45 
5.1 General ....................................................................................................................................... 45 
5.2 Limitations .................................................................................................................................. 46 
5.3 Future Research .......................................................................................................................... 46 
Appendix A Experiment 1: Information & Consent Form ................................................................... 48 
Appendix B Experiment 1: Zero Delay Questionnaire ........................................................................ 51 
Appendix C Experiment 1: 2-week Delay Questionnaire .................................................................... 56 
Appendix D Experiment 1: 2-month Delay Questionnaire .................................................................. 61 
Appendix E Experiment 2: No-delay Questionnaire ............................................................................ 66 
Appendix F Experiment 2: 2-month Delay Questionnaire ................................................................... 67 
 
 viii 
Appendix G Experiment 2: 1-year Delay Questionnaire ..................................................................... 68 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 69 
 
 ix 
List of Figures 
Figure 1: Diminishing Marginal Utility and Risk Aversion. .................................................................. 6 
Figure 2: (A) Value function v as a function of gains and losses. (B) Probability weighting function w 




List of Tables 
Table 1: Four-fold Pattern of Risk Attitudes. ........................................................................................ 9 
Table 2: Previous Findings of Risk Attitudes in Related Literature. ................................................... 25 
Table 3: A Sample Set of Questions from Survey - Experiment 1. ..................................................... 28 
Table 4: Risk Attitude Percentages for Subjects in each Choice Set – Experiment 1. ........................ 29 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Certainty Equivalents – Experiment 1. .......................................... 30 
Table 6: Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance – Experiment 1. ................................................... 32 
Table 7: Contrast Tests between all combinations of no-delay, 2-week delay, and 2-month delay 
groups – Experiment 1. ........................................................................................................................ 33 
Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Probability Rating Question – Experiment 1. ................................ 34 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Rating Question – Experiment 1. ................................... 35 
Table 10: Risk Attitude Percentages for Subjects over all 6 Questions – Experiment 2. .................... 39 
Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Certainty Equivalents – Experiment 2. ........................................ 40 
Table 12: Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance – Experiment 2. ................................................. 42 
Table 13: Contrast Tests between all combinations of no-delay, 2-month delay, and 1-year delay 





Risk is an unavoidable dimension of many everyday decisions.  Examples of risky decisions 
span all parts of life ranging from simple decisions such as purchasing a lottery ticket or to relatively 
more important, potentially life-changing decisions such as whether to undertake a newly developed 
medical treatment or investing one’s entire savings in the stock market etc.  Regardless, risky decision 
making is something that everyone personally deals with on a day-to-day basis. 
 What defines people’s choices in risky situations however?  One important factor is personal 
preferences or attitudes.  Many of us would not bet our life saving’s on a spin at the roulette table 
while a select few may be inclined to do so.  In this case, the attitude towards risk is what defines how 
such decisions are arrived at.  In the above example, the select few who would play such a gamble 
would display risk-seeking behavior while the majority of people would comparably display risk-
averse behavior. 
 Empirical research on decision making under risk has uncovered many other perceptual and 
contextual factors that might influence attitudes towards risk (Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1997; Allais, 
1953; Anderhub, Güth, Gneezy, & Sonsino, 2001; Chateauneuf & Wakker, 1999; Ellsberg, 1961; 
Glockner & Betsch, 2008; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Levy, 1992; March & Shapira, 1992; Nguyen 
& Leung, 2009; Onay & Öncüler, 2007; Öncüler, 2000; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Savage, 1954; 
P. Wakker & Tversky, 1993; P. P. Wakker, 2010; Wu, Zhang, & Gonzalez, 2008).  One important 
factor that influences attitudes towards risk is temporal distance to the resolution of the risk.  This is 
not to be confused with how someone’s risk attitude changes over time (e.g., with age), but rather 
how it changes based on delay until realization of outcomes.  
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Naturally many of the risky decisions we face have delayed outcomes.  This subset of risky 
decisions is known as risky intertemporal decisions.   For example, insurance is not bought to protect 
oneself against an immediate loss but rather the potential of loss that can be incurred in the future.  In 
other words, individuals buy car insurance for an accident that may happen a year or two in the 
future.  Similarly, most investments are long term and you make them with delayed outcomes in 
mind.  People don’t usually buy stocks with the intention of selling them in a day and likewise a 
company doesn’t invest in R&D with the expectation that profits will double in a week.   
 Although previous research has acknowledged that time does indeed influence risk 
preferences and that individuals may prefer different options when the gamble is delayed versus 
immediate (Abdellaoui, Diecidue, & Öncüler, 2011; Ahlbrecht & Weber, 1997; Anderson & Stafford, 
2009; Baucells & Heukamp, 2011; Keren & Roelofsma, 1995; Noussair & Wu, 2006; Onay & 
Öncüler, 2007; Sagristano, Trope, & Liberman, 2002; Shelley, 1994; Weber & Chapman, 2005), they 
have mainly focused on risky intertemporal choice in the gains domain.  However, risky decisions in 
the loss domain are as common as the ones in the gains domain.  For instance, an insurance problem 
is entirely in the loss domain.  In one case, one incurs a small fixed loss (i.e., the insurance premium) 
to cover a chance of a larger loss, and in the other case, one takes a chance of incurring a large 
variable loss.  Thus, in order to close this gap in the risky intertemporal choice literature, we will 
focus on risky intertemporal choice in the loss domain.  We expect to find different results than what 
has been found in the gains domain as individual have been shown to treat losses psychologically 
different than gains (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991). 
Based on Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003) we conjecture that there will be 
a greater focus on outcomes over probabilities in delayed gambles, and hence individuals would 
become more risk-averse for delayed risky losses.  We conducted two experiments to test our 
hypothesis.  In our experiments we compared gambles of immediate versus delayed resolution time 
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with both real and hypothetical incentives.  In experiment 1, we conducted a series of choice tasks 
with real incentives and found that individual in the immediate resolution group were significantly 
more risk-seeking than those in the future resolution groups.  In experiment 2, we conducted a series 
of pricing tasks in hypothetical scenarios and also found that individual became more risk-averse as 
the resolution time of the outcome was increased contrary to the decrease in risk aversion with 
increased delay observed in the gains domain (Noussair & Wu, 2006). 
 The thesis will start off by summarizing the literature on risky choice starting with Expected 
Utility Theory (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) and Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), then we will review theories of intertemporal decision making such as Discounted Utility 
Theory (Samuelson, 1937) and Construal Level Theory (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  There will then 
be a detailed review of risky intertemporal choice literature in the gains domain and mixed domain.  I 
will also discuss the implications of Construal Level Theory on risky intertemporal decisions in this 
section.  The thesis will proceed a presentation of experimental procedures and design, analysis of 
data and discussion of the results.  It will conclude by looking at an overview of the experiments, the 





2.1 Risky Choice 
Many real world decisions involve risky choice as it covers a wide spectrum of everyday 
decisions people make.  Examples of such decisions include gambling, many if not all areas of 
investment, medical treatments, R&D projects, and insurance decisions to name a few.  In many cases 
(as is evident from the list above) the exact chance or probabilities involved in the risky choice 
themselves are uncertain or unknown.  Decisions in which the probabilities are certain and objectively 
known (such as in many gambling scenarios like playing poker or blackjack) are known as decision 
under risk. Decisions in which the probabilities are unknown (such as whether or not it will rain on a 
particular day) are known as decision under uncertainty (Savage, 1954).  The focus of this thesis will 
be on the former as the results can often be generalized to include the latter. 
2.1.1 Expected Utility Theory 
Risky choice refers to choices in which a decision maker chooses among lotteries defined as 
  (  ,   ;…;   ,   ) giving outcome     at probability    such that ∑    .  Expected value of a 
lottery is defined as   ( )  ∑       and expected utility is defined as   ( )   ∑    (  ), where 
in this case  (  ) measures the utility of receiving outcome    (Wu et al., 2008).  
Expected Utility Theory developed by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) showed that if 
a decision maker’s choice obeys the four axioms of choice, namely the completeness, transitivity, 
continuity, and independence, then decision maker’s choices over lotteries can be represented by a 
utility function unique up to an affine transformation.   Completeness axiom states that a decision 
maker has well defined preferences.  That is, for any lotteries L, M, exactly one of the following 
holds: LM, M L, or L=M.  In other words either L is preferred, M is preferred, or there is no 
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preference between the two.  Transitivity posits that preference must be consistent across any three 
options.  Thus if M L and NM, then N L.  Continuity is the idea that if NM L, then there 
exists a probability p ∈ [0, 1] such that pN + (1-p)L ∽ M.  Finally, the independence axiom is if A B 
then pA + (1-p)C pB + (1-p)C.   
We need more definitions in order to quantify risk attitudes.  A certainty equivalent (CE) of a 
lottery   (  ,   ;…;   ,   ) is defined as the sure amount of money     that makes the decision 
maker indifferent between receiving     or playing the lottery   . That is equivalent to saying the 
utility of the certainty equivalent of lottery   is equal to the expected utility of   or  (   )    ( ).  
Risk-averse behavior is exhibited if and only if   ( )    ( ).  Risk-neutral behavior is exhibited if 
and only if   ( )    ( ).  Lastly, risk-seeking behavior is exhibited if and only if   ( )  
  ( ).  In general the classical model of decision under risk assumes that individuals are generally 
risk-averse.  This is because, in general, (marginal) utility obtained from winning an extra dollar 
declines as additional dollars are won.  This is equivalent to saying that the decision maker has a 
concave utility function which is the same as saying he/she is risk-averse. 
Expected Utility Theory explains risk attitudes completely through the shape of the utility 
function.  If a utility function is convex, risk-seeking behavior such as buying lottery tickets is 
observed.  This is because under convex utility functions the expected value of a gamble is less than 
the certainty equivalent of a gamble.  On the other hand, if the utility function is concave, risk-averse 
behavior such as purchasing insurance is exhibited.  This is because under concave utility, the 
certainty equivalent of a gamble is less than the expected value of a gamble.  If the function is linear 
then risk-neutral behavior is exhibited where the certainty equivalent is equal to the expected value 
(Pratt, 1964). 
To better understand this, consider the following example.  Suppose a decision maker is faced 
with a gamble with 0.5 chance at winning $400 and 0.5 chance at winning $100 assuming a concave 
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utility function of  ( )   √ .  The expected value is 0.5(400) + 0.5(100) = $250.  The expected 
utility is 0.5u(400) + 0.5u(100) = 0.5*20 + 0.5*10 = 15.  Using the original utility function we can 
find the certainty equivalent corresponding to this amount or 15 = √   implying CE = $225.  In this 
case we find that certainty equivalent of the gamble is less than the expected value of the gamble as 
$225 < $250.  The difference of these two numbers is also known as the risk premium.   As the 
individual values this gamble at less than its expected value, it is transparent that he/she is risk-
averse. Figure 1 below gives a visual representation of this problem.  In the case for risk-seeking, the 
certainty equivalent of the gamble would be more than the expected value of the gamble as the 
function is convex.  The case for risk-neutral corresponds to a utility function that is the same as the 
expected value function as can be seen as the linear line in Figure 1.  
Figure 1: Diminishing Marginal Utility and Risk Aversion. 
An extension of EUT was produced by Lucas (1978) when he created a Discounted Expected 
Utility Model (DEU) to evaluate risky outcomes over time.  This model is very similar to the EUT 
model except in addition to a probability weighting function, there is a discount function to weight the 
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value of each outcome.  The general form is: ∑    
  (   ) where the only aspects that have changed 
from EUT are that there is a summation over time and a discount function represented as   .  
Although there is the inclusion of the time parameter in DEU, it tells nothing about how risk attitudes 
should change with time much like EUT.  Rather, the model assumes independent time and risk 
preferences and therefore cannot predict how an individual’s risk attitude will be affected by a 
temporal delay. 
2.1.2 Prospect Theory 
Even though EUT is a normative theory of risky decision making (i.e., how people should 
make risky decisions), there has been research that has shown it is not valid from the descriptive point 
of view (i.e., how people actually make risky decisions) (Wu et al., 2008).  On the other hand, 
Prospect Theory is a descriptive theory or in other words it tells us how people actually make 
decisions rather than only looking at optimal decisions.  
Prospect Theory (PT) is introduced by Kahneman and Tversky’s influential paper “Prospect 
Theory: An analysis of decision under risk” (1979).  The major components of their theory were a 
probability weighting function and a value function.  Thus, the general form is: ∑ (  ) (  ) where 
 (  ) represents the value function and  (  ) represents the weighting function.   
In EUT the utility function is defined over final wealth states whereas the value function is 
defined over changes in wealth (defined in terms of gains and losses) rather than absolute wealth 
levels.  Also, although utility may be linear in the probabilities in EUT, value is not.  This value 
function is concave for gains and convex for losses.  The function is steeper for losses than gains as it 
exhibits loss aversion, which addresses one of the major pitfalls of EUT in that there is an observed 
gains/loss symmetry that EUT cannot capture.  The probability function on the other hand identifies 




Figure 2: (A) Value function v as a function of gains and losses. (B) Probability weighting 
function w as a function of the probability p of a chance event. Source: (Trepel, Fox, & 
Poldrack, 2005). 
 
In figure 2 we can examine a qualitative representation of the value and probability functions 
in Prospect Theory as discussed above.  Key characteristics from the value function are that it is 
defined in terms of losses and gains from a reference point, it has diminishing sensitivity, and its 
steeper for losses than for gains (loss aversion).  In terms of the probability weighting function, the 
schematic weighting of the function presented by Tversky and Kahneman underweighted medium 
and large probabilities, and overweighed small probabilities.  Hence, we see that probabilities lower 
than approximately 0.3 are overweighed whereas probabilities greater are underweighted. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1974) also found that people are not always risk-averse.  In 
particular they found that in the gains domain although 84% of participants preferred $500 for sure 
over $1000 with 0.5 chance and hence exhibited risk-averse behavior, 72% of the participants also 
preferred a 0.001 chance of $5000 to $5 for sure exhibiting risk-seeking behavior.  On the other hand, 
in the case of losses, 69% of subjects chose a 0.5 chance at losing $1000 to losing $500 for sure (i.e., 
exhibited risk-seeking behavior), while 83% chose losing $5 for sure over losing $500 with 0.001 
chance (i.e., exhibited risk-averse behavior).  That is, in the gains domain people are risk-averse for 
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moderate probabilities and risk-seeking for small probabilities.  However in the loss domain, they 
exhibit the exact opposite or risk-seeking for moderate probabilities and risk-averse for small 
probabilities.  
 These findings lead to the four-fold pattern of risk attitudes that explained preferences for 
gambles in the gains and loss domain for small and medium/large probabilities (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). 
 Small Probabilities Medium/Large Probabilities 
Gains Risk-seeking Risk-averse 
Losses Risk-averse Risk-seeking 
Table 1: Four-fold Pattern of Risk Attitudes. 
 
In attempting to introduce the effects of time, we can introduce a discount function into 
Prospect Theory similar to what was done for EUT.  The new form would be: ∑  (  ) 
  (   ) for a 
discounted Prospect Theory model (DPT). In this case much like the shift from EUT to DEU, the 
functional form is identical except that there is a summation over time and a discount function 
represented as   . 
Although Prospect Theory and DPT are improvements over EUT in describing how 
individuals assess risky gambles, both theories do not address time dependencies of risk attitudes.  In 
the next section, there will be a greater examination of the discount function and its shortcomings in 
addition to its inability to address why risk attitudes should change with time.  
2.2 Intertemporal Choice 
Time is a fundamental factor in how people make decisions.  Many choices require 
individuals to trade-off costs and benefits at different points of time.  Decisions with consequences in 
multiple time periods are known as intertemporal choices.  Do you buy a fancy dinner today and eat 
cheap for the rest of the week?  Do you skip purchasing the latest music player in favour of accruing 
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more interest in your savings account?  Decisions in the realm of education, savings, work effort, 
nutrition, exercise, and healthcare are all intertemporal choices (Chabris, Laibson, & Schultdt, 2008).  
Discounted utility theory is the most widely used framework for analyzing intertemporal choices. 
2.2.1 Discounted Utility Theory 
The Discounted Utility (DU) Model arose from Paul Samuelson’s “A Note on Measurement 
of Utility” (1937).  The paper outlined a utility function representing intertemporal preferences with 
the normative property that such individual are consistent with their preferences.  In other words, the 
relative consumption in two periods t and t+k will remain constant through time (i.e., if $100 in 2015 
is equivalent to $150 in 2018 for an individual then $100 in 2020 should be equivalent to $150 in 
2023 and so on).  The model is essentially a preference on bundles of consumption (ct,…, cT) where ct 
is the consumption in the first period and cT represents the consumption in the last period.  The 
general model is given as: 
  (      )  ∑  ( )
   
    (    ) where:  ( )  (
 
   
) . 
  (      ) is defined over the consumption bundle (      ) which represent the utility of that 
bundle.  Furthermore, in this representation,  (    ) is the individual’s cardinal instantaneous utility 
function or the utility gained from consuming a specific amount in a particular period.   ( ) is the 
discount function and r is a parameter of the model that represents the individual’s pure rate of time 
preference or the individual’s discount rate (Frederick, Loewenstein, & O'Donoghue, 2002). 
The DU model is named such because it discounts consumption in each successive period at a 
rate of r.  The variable factor from individual to individual is how much value is placed on the utility 
of consumption in a period t+k relative to the utility of consumption in a period t.  This is all captured 
in the parameter r (or the discount rate) which can be positive, negative, or zero given on if the 
individual weights the present more highly than the future (normally the case), the future more highly 
than the present, or both equally respectively. 
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The other part of the DU model is the u(.) which represents the utility gained from 
consumption defined over a single period.  The utility of a consumption bundle is defined as the sum 
of the utilities of consumption discounted at a rate of r in each period.  A major point in this model is 
that individuals are dynamically consistent where their decisions will not change over time which 
equates to not being able to use a varying discount rate through time (causing conflicting views of 
what the best course of action is according to this model) (Strotz, 1953). 
One of the major flaws of this model arises from the dynamic inconsistency in the form of 
hyperbolic discounting.  Hyperbolic discounting or a time-inconsistent form of discounting is often 
used to signify that a person has a declining rate of time preference (Frederick et al., 2002).  A typical 
experiment used to reveal hyperbolic discounting tendencies involve comparing short-term 
preferences against long-term preferences.  Using pairs of hypothetical amounts of money available 
after different delays, when smaller immediate amounts were chosen over larger delayed amounts an 
introduction of a constant delay in both conditions resulted in a reversal of preferences (Green, 
Fristoe, & Myerson, 1994).  For example, someone may prefer $50 today over $100 available in 2-
months, but also prefer $100 in 6 months opposed to $50 in 4 months.  This pattern of preference 
directly contradicts the standard DU model as the discount rate is not constant. 
Another anomaly of the DU model is that small outcomes are discounted more than large 
ones.  For example, subjects in Thaler’s (1981) study exhibited varying discount rates based on the 
amount.  Thaler identified subjects on average were indifferent between $15 now and $60 in a year, 
$250 now and $350 in a year, and $3000 now and $4000 in a year which corresponds to a 139, 34, 
and 29 percent discount rate respectively.  Again, the DU model fails to address this phenomenon and 
cannot reliably be used to model intertemporal decision making. 
In addition to these shortcomings, DU much like all the previous models (EUT, DEU, PT, 
DPT) does not examine how risk attitudes should change with time.  In order to better understand 
why risk attitudes do indeed change over time and the basis of our hypothesis it is important to 
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examine a theory of psychological distance (temporal in our case) that addresses why and how time 
delay can influence individuals’ attitudes towards risk. 
2.2.2 Construal Level Theory  
Construal Level Theory (CLT) posits that psychological distances (e.g., spatial, social, 
probabilistic, and temporal) affect how people mentally represent events in their mind.  Whether an 
event is classified as more abstract or concrete in one’s mental representation is based upon the 
magnitude of the psychological distance.  Individuals mentally represent near-future events with low-
level construals and far-future events with high-level construals.  High-level construals are seen as 
abstract and superordinate representations of events while low-level construals are more concrete and 
subordinate representations (Trope & Liberman, 2010). 
The idea behind this subordinate versus superordinate is that the former is always contained 
in the latter whereas the reverse is not the case.  In this sense superordinate events are always one step 
or rank ahead in that they encompass a more abstract concept.  For instance a high-level construal 
could be representing an event as “having fun” while a low level-construal would be moving to 
representing it as “playing tennis”.  Playing tennis is subordinate to having fun.  It is also more 
specific in that it gives more incidental details such as information about the activity that “having 
fun” does not contain.  However, this is not to say that higher level construals are vaguer than lower 
level construals in every sense.  A great deal of the time additional higher order information may be 
extracted from the higher level construals (Trope & Liberman, 2010).  In this case “having fun” could 
entail many other activities or concepts that “playing tennis” does not imply. 
A key distinction between high-level and low-level construals is the emphasis on desirability 
compared to feasibility of outcomes respectively (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  Desirability looks at an 
action’s end state in contrast to feasibility that is more concerned with the difficulty in reaching such 
an end state.  Feasibility examines the subordinate nature of an action (i.e., how) whereas desirability 
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looks at the superordinate nature of an action (i.e., why) (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987).  As a result 
desirability is considered a high-level construal in contrast to feasibility which is considered a low-
level construal.  Placing this in the context of CLT, far-future preferences are more likely to be 
affected by desirability considerations while near-future preferences are more likely to be affected by 
feasibility considerations.  Such near or far-future preferences are dependent however on the 
psychological distance. 
The major component of CLT is psychological distance.  Psychological distance is the 
driving force behind what shifts representations in our minds from low-level construals to high-level 
construals.  This is because high-level construals remain more unchanged compared to low-level 
construals as one become more distant to it (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  As a result, it is much easier 
to look at an event in terms of high-level construals when the psychological distance is large because 
it can be tough to grasp any sort of low-level construal representations of the event (Trope & 
Liberman, 2010).   
In this thesis, there will be a focus on the temporal distance as we are most interested in the 
effects of time in risky decision making.  CLT predicts that as temporal distance increases preferences 
are more likely to reflect the value associated with high-level construal of options opposed to that of 
low-level construal of options.  This means that the value linked with low-level construals is 
diminished or discounted with temporal distance while the corresponding value of high-level 
construals is magnified with temporal distance (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  But how is this linked to 
risky intertemporal decisions?  What part of a gamble can be represented as a high-level construal or 
superordinate feature and what part can be represented as low-level construal or subordinate feature? 
A typical lottery has a probability and outcome associated with winning.  When comparing 
outcome to probability, according to CLT outcome is seen as a superordinate feature as it determines 
the desirability of the end state of the gamble; probability on the other hand is a subordinate feature as 
it determines the feasibility of winning.  Another way of saying this is that an individual will only 
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care about the probability if the outcome is high whereas the outcome will be important regardless of 
whether the probability is high or low. 
 Connecting this to risky decision making, Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman (2002) found that 
temporal distance did indeed increase participants’ focus on desirability (outcomes) while decreasing 
their focus on feasibility (probability).  They showed that desirability was superordinate to feasibility 
and subsequently that people are more risk-seeking in the case of the gains domain (and by extension 
more risk-averse in the loss domain) as there is a greater focus on outcome in the far-future.  More 





Risky Intertemporal Choice 
3.1 Risky Intertemporal Choice 
Risky intertemporal choice combines elements from risky decision making with individuals’ 
temporal preferences.  Time preference or discounting is how much more a decision maker values a 
good now over later.  Risk preference is whether an individual exhibits risk-seeking, risk-averse, or 
risk-neutral behavior.  In this section we will summarize empirical research on showing whether and 
how a decision makers risk preferences change when outcomes are delayed.  Furthermore, this 
section will examine how changes on the amount of the outcome, the associated probabilities, and 
whether the gamble is in the loss, gains, or mixed domain affects risky intertemporal choice. 
3.2 Gains Domain 
The majority of the research in risky intertemporal choice has been carried out in the gains 
domain as it is much easier to supply real incentives.  Although a large amount of research has been 
done relative to the mixed and loss domain, it is still an area that has much to be explored.  In this 
section we will closely examine a few of the key studies and the subsequent conclusions we can 
arrive at from the results of these studies. 
In a recent study, Abdellaoui, Diecidue, and Öncüler (2011) looked at risky intertemporal 
decision making in the gains domain through a series of choice tasks with real incentives. The focus 
of their experiment was to look at risky intertemporal choice by establishing individual preferences at 
different points of time.  52 subjects had a choice between a lottery and a sure amount of money.  
This was done to get the certainty equivalents for 10 different lotteries.  Also, four different 
independent sessions were carried out that consisted of immediate, 6-month delay, 12-month delay, 
and an ambiguous delay between 0 and 12 months.  A bisection method was used to find the certainty 
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equivalents (CE).  For instance one choice may be between the gamble: (200, 0.33; 0) and $66 for 
sure.  Choosing the latter would indicate that the CE is in (0, 66) interval, choosing the former 
indicates that CE is in the (66, 200) interval. This was continued on with different sure options until a 
CE could be found for the gamble (200, 0.33; 0).   
They found that on average the subjects’ certainty equivalents went up as the evaluation 
period increased.  For the ambiguous delay between 0 and 12 months the values lied between those 
for 0 and 6 months delay.  Then, the certainty equivalents were used to elicit the utility functions and 
the probability weighting functions.  Power estimates for utility revealed that delay had no significant 
impact on utility while having an impact on the probability weighting function.  Their results revealed 
that there was higher risk-seeking for lotteries played out in the future in the gains domain.  
According to the authors, people are more “optimistic” about lotteries played out in the future due to 
a temporal change in probability weighting as the utility functions stays the same for future lotteries. 
In another recent paper, Anderson and Stafford (2009) examined risky intertemporal choice 
in the gains domain with real decisions and time delays.  In their experiment, subjects choose between 
a certain and a risky payoff or two risky payoffs in the future (with some temporal delay between 
them).  Also, resolution of the gamble happened on the actual payment date.  Their experiment 
involved 25 choice tasks.  The choice task involved choosing between two payment options for a set 
of 25 scenarios.  Option A was paid in 2 weeks from the date of the experiment and Option B was 
paid in 2 weeks plus n days.  The 2-week delay was included to control for the immediacy effect 
which occurs if outcomes later in time are perceived as less certain and thus the imminent future 
receives a disproportionate weight in the evaluation process (Keren & Roelofsma, 1995).  The only 
constant was that Option A always had an expected value of $20, while Option B’s value was from 
$22 to $30 dollars.  Varying for each scenario was the level of risk associated with the options (i.e., 
certain vs. risky, risky vs. risky, risky vs. certain for Option A and Option B respectively).  They 
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utilized Ellsberg’s urn design where the options represented multiple colors that could be drawn to get 
certain payments (Ellsberg, 1961).  For example, Option A could be receive $20 for sure on 
November 19 and Option B could be receive $20 on December 3 if a red ball is drawn (75 out of 100) 
or receive $28 if a yellow ball is drawn (25 out of 100).  They also used three temporal extensions (+n 
days) of 14, 28, and 56 days with 6 sessions each.  Within each session, the first five scenarios were 
choice tasks between a certain payment of $20 in 2 weeks and certain payment of $X in 2 weeks plus 
n days where n was 14.1, 14.2, 28.1, 28.2, and 56 to elicit certainty equivalents.   
They discovered the percentage of subjects choosing Option B increased as the value of 
Option B increased and the percentage of subjects choosing Option B became smaller for a given 
value the longer the delay between both options was.  Few subjects made the same choice for a pair 
of expected values regardless of the presence of risk.  They also found that very few subjects were 
consistently risk-averse and that risk in intertemporal decision made subjects less patient (take the 
earlier payment option regardless of whether risk occurs in the early or latter payoff).  
The results here are inconclusive in determining whether an intertemporal delay will make 
someone more risk-seeking in the gains domain.  A downfall of the experimental design that could be 
attributed to the ambiguous results is the difference in the payouts was of too low magnitude causing 
participants to exhibit a lack of “patience”.  Öncüler (2000) found this lack of patience in hypothetical 
matching tasks for gambles opposed to certain outcomes as well.  Öncüler also observed that the 
introduction of risk has less effect on decisions made in the future opposed to those made in the 
present. 
In a similar study, Noussair and Wu (2006) looked at how risk preferences differ towards 
lotteries in the gains domain that were resolved and paid in the future versus the present with real 
cash incentives.  The general framework behind their experiment was to give the participants a choice 
between two lotteries: one risky and one less risky.  Each subject was then required to make ten 
choices between the two lotteries in two separate rounds.  The 10 choices differed with probabilities 
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assigned to winning the higher and lower amounts within the lottery.  Subjects would then use two 
rolls of a 10 sided dice to determine which gamble they would actually play and the corresponding 
high or low payoff they would receive.  A comparison was done within subject on whether they were 
more risk averse, seeking, or neutral over time whether they chose the risky lottery in the future less, 
more, or the same amount respectively compared to the present.  It was found that 38.6% of subjects 
were more risk-seeing while 9.1% were more risk-averse for future gambles.   
They believe that their estimate was conservative in the sense that with smaller probability 
increments a larger percentage of the participants would become more risk-seeking for future gambles 
(i.e., the 10% shift between the questions was too crude and a smaller grain would have given 
significantly better results).  Furthermore, they found an increased time horizon to also create more 
risk-seeking in the domain of positive payoffs.  In other words, people are less risk-averse when the 
risk is in the far-future opposed to immediate risks. 
On the other hand, Onay and Öncüler (2009) looked at path dependency in risky 
intertemporal choice in three hypothetical experiments in the gains domain.  In each experiment 
subjects were asked to give the present value of a lottery to be resolved and paid in the future at a 
known time in three different ways.  The first way involved subjects directly eliciting the present 
certainty equivalent in a single evaluation (direct path).  In the second way subjects first indicated 
their future certainty equivalent for the future lottery and then the present value of the future certainty 
equivalent (risk-time path).  Lastly, subjects were asked to give the present value of the risky prospect 
and then the certainty equivalent for this current lottery (time-risk path).   
Their results suggest that time and risk preferences are not independent for a decision maker 
in the case of risky future prospects.  They find that the evaluation of future gambles is path-
dependent as the present values elicited from the direct and time-risk methods are higher on average 
than those observed from the risk-time path.  Furthermore, they found evidence of a two-stage 
evaluation for risky future prospects.  Individuals first assess the present value of the gamble (time 
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discounting) and then determine a certainty equivalent (probability discounting) when evaluating a 
gamble in the future.  The implications are relevant to the loss domain as well since the method in 
which the gamble is assessed will affect the risk attitude of the decision maker. 
Overall, previous literature supports that people become relatively more risk-seeking in the 
gains domain as the temporal delay of a risky gamble increases.  Although in some case the results 
were ambiguous, it was usually due to fault in experimental design where either the probabilities were 
not fine enough or the difference in amounts was not perceived as significant.  Furthermore, the type 
of elicitation procedure used is significant as an individual’s certainty equivalent will be affected as a 
result. 
3.3 Mixed Domain 
The mixed domain involves gambles with both positive and negative outcomes.  In that 
sense, it is similar to the loss domain as it is hard to give real incentives in the case of mixed domain 
gambles.  Overall, little research has been done in the mixed domain.  In this section we will examine 
one of the most famous studies in the mixed domain for risky intertemporal choice.  
Shelley (1994) examined risky intertemporal choice in the mixed domain.  She found that 
delayed losses are seen as more attractive than immediate ones while delayed gains are seen as less 
attractive than immediate ones in the case of risky choices.  The study examined this by having 
participants evaluate the desirability of gambles to be played in the present as well as in the future.  
Risky gambles were evaluated more positively in the distant future as a result of the asymmetry 
between gains and losses.  The study found that both time discounting as well as implicit risk for the 
lottery evaluation task act as factors in gains/loss asymmetries.   
In terms of time discounting even though both losses and gains showed similar patterns of 
decline over time it was found that there was a noticeable difference in magnitude.  The loss rate was 
found to still be higher than the gains rate even with implicit rate being taken into consideration.  In 
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other words, the expected severity of losses went down much faster with time than the supposed 
benefit of gains.  This points to people in general believing losses are more likely to not occur or they 
have greater control over lowering losses when they are in the future in comparison to gains which 
are seen as more concrete.  An increase in risk-seeking can therefore be linked to a gains/loss 
asymmetry connected to implicit risk as the perceived uncertainty involving loss is greater than gains.  
This leads to the conclusion that decision makers will gravitate towards more risky alternatives in the 
far-future.   
In terms of implicit risk discounting it comes down to decision makers viewing gains as more 
credible than losses in the future.   A few theories are proposed by March and Shapira (1992) that 
have to do with the connection between self-confidence and risk taking.  Previous risky situations that 
turned successful for a decision maker become attributed to their skills and not of good fortune which 
translates to discounting loss more heavily because they do not imagine suffering a loss in the future 
or the loss will not be as bad as imagined.  Since losses are discounted more steeply over delay than 
gains are, it makes sense that losses are weighted more heavily in the present.  The results indicated 
that most decision makers are risk-averse in the short run while becoming more and more risk-
seeking in the long run for mixed gambles. 
From the results, it appears that the mixed domain is similar to the gains domain in that 
individuals become more risk-seeking as the temporal delay increases.  Although these findings are 
important, it is hard to take any results from the mixed domain and apply them to the loss domain as 
the exact interaction can be hard to pinpoint.  
3.4 Gains and Loss Domain 
A few studies have examined the effects of time in risky intertemporal choice in both the 
gains and loss domain.  As far as we know, the majority of these studies have been hypothetical in 
nature.  Two of the major studies will be examined in this section. 
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In one study, Albrecht and Weber (1997) examined risky and certain intertemporal decision 
making through hypothetical experiments involving lotteries in both the gains and loss domain.  They 
predicted that the influence of delay would be sensitive to the type of elicitation procedure used (in 
this case matching versus choice).  A sample matching task involved the subject stating the amount in 
Deutsche Marks (DM) that they would receive today that would make them indifferent to a lottery of 
receiving DM 250 with 0.5 chance or DM 0 otherwise.  A sample equivalent choice task would be the 
subject deciding on whether they prefer a sure amount today, a lottery of receiving DM 250 with 0.5 
chance or DM 0 otherwise, or are indifferent to the two.  The finding of most interest was whether 
any short-long term asymmetry was found (an example of such an asymmetry would be a preference 
of $10 today over $12 tomorrow implying a preference of $10 in 10 days over $12 in 11 days).  In the 
case of the choice task, no short-long term asymmetry was found whereas for the matching task it 
was.  The authors justify this as for the choice tasks, participants disregard the common delay (i.e., 
certain reward in 6 months vs. a risky reward in 12 months is seen as the same as certain reward now 
vs. a risky reward in 12 months) while for matching this is not possible as all the alternatives are 
considered individually.   
This is important as it explains why there may be discrepancies in a choice versus matching 
experiment.  However, gains and losses were not found to be discounted at different rates.  The 
results showed no significant relationship between risk aversion and individual discount rates in both 
the gains and loss domain.  Rather, they found that the discount rate was sensitive to the type of 
elicitation procedure used and risky options were discounted less than certain ones in the case of 
matching (certain outcomes were found to be discounted more than risky ones). 
Similarly, Weber and Chapman (2005) closely examined the “peanuts effect” (Prelec & 
Loewenstein, 1991) which was the effect of decreasing risk aversion with decreasing monetary 
amounts that was first discovered by Markowitz (1952).  In other words, decision makers will become 
less risk-averse when playing for “peanuts” (very small gains).  Markowitz also extended the peanuts 
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effect into the loss domain in that decision makers are more risk-seeking for small losses compared to 
large losses. Weber and Chapman broke their study into two experiments.  The first being a choice 
experiment (participants would choose between two gambles) while the second was a choice and 
ratings experiment (participants would rate the attractiveness of a gamble from 1-100).  They found 
that the peanuts effect only occurs when probabilities are high as this makes disappointment possible. 
They also found that the peanuts effect was slightly larger in the case of rating response in 
comparison to choice response in the loss domain. 
Although the peanuts effect does not look at risk attitudes in the context of time it still has 
interesting applications.  It can be used to explain why individuals may remain risk-seeking in the loss 
domain for the far-future.  If amounts may be seen as too small or “peanuts” then the peanuts effects 
may overpower any influence from a greater focus on outcomes over probabilities. 
3.5 Implications of Construal Level Theory 
As we mentioned in section 2.2, according to CLT, psychological distance influences 
perceptions and mental representations of objects and events.  In the case of this thesis, the temporal 
distance is of most concern.  In this section, we will examine two relevant studies of CLT in the 
context of risky intertemporal choice. 
Sagristano, Trope, and Liberman (2002) investigated the hypothesis that far-future events are 
represented in a more abstract, high-level manner than near-future events and subsequently a greater 
focus on outcome (desirability) over probability (feasibility) would be observed in risky choice when 
lotteries are delayed.  In general, CLT predicts that temporal distance affects peoples’ responses to 
events in the future by changing the way they mentally represent such events.  As a result high-level 
construals are likely to include superordinate rather than subordinate goals.   
Their first study found that desirability is superordinate to feasibility through asking subjects 
a series of rating questions with controllable and uncontrollable outcomes.  People were likely to 
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focus on desirability more when the temporal distance was great and feasibility more when the 
temporal distance was small.  The subjective importance of the feasibility in getting an outcome 
depended on how desirable the outcome was, whereas the importance of the desirability of an 
outcome was independent of its feasibility.  Translating this into the gambling domain, their second 
study found that probabilities were subordinate to payoffs using the same methods as the previous 
study.  As a result they were able to have probabilities match feasibility criteria while payoffs were 
able to match desirability criteria.  The subjective importance of the probability involved in winning 
depended on the payoff whereas the importance of the payoff was independent of the probability in 
winning.  Hence, in terms of hierarchical preference it is more important to seek information 
regarding the payoff or desirability of an outcome over the probability or feasibility of an outcome.   
Relating this to CLT, the probability involved in the payoff should play a larger role in 
deciding on a near-future or temporally close gamble while the payoff itself should play a more 
influential role in deciding on a distant future or temporally distant gamble.  Sagristano (2002) 
confirmed this as near-future participants preferred to sacrifice payoff for better odds while far-future 
participants were more willing to gamble with worse odds in return for higher payoffs.  Hence, 
temporal distance acted to increase the weight placed on payoffs in comparison to probability in the 
gambling domain.   
The results imply that individuals become more risk-seeking in the gains domain as the 
temporal distance increases for the gamble as they put more weight on the outcome and less on the 
probability as compared to a temporally close gamble.  Conversely, in this thesis we hypothesize that 
individuals should become more risk-averse in the loss domain as the temporal distance increases 
because of the increased weight of payoffs in decisions. 
On a similar note, Maglio, Trope, and Liberman (2011) found that an initial instantiation of 
psychological distance caused a generalized reduction in sensitivity to subsequent instantiations of 
distance.  For example a within-dimension sensitivity to temporal distance would be that a given span 
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of time (one day delay) exerts less influence on choice when it follows an initial instantiation 
(occurring 365 days in the future) than when it does not (occurring immediately).  Furthermore, since 
different psychological distances are conceptualized as sharing similar meaning, they found that an 
initial instantiation of any distance produces a similar reduction in sensitivity to a second instantiation 
of any dimension of distance (example: a wait of one month would seem shorter when it pertains to a 
spatially more distant event). 
This is relevant as representing a target as far away makes it so extra psychological distances 
are made less influential than when they exist nearby.  In line with risky intertemporal choice, this 
predicts that an instantiation of the psychological distance of time will cause a reduction in sensitivity 
to the psychological distance of probability in the case of risky gambles. In other words, only looking 
at the effects of probability, a person should be more risk-seeking for a risky gamble in the far-future 
than in the near-future for the gains domain because they will be less sensitive to the probability.  For 
the loss domain, only looking at the effects of probability, this would also indicate they should be 
more risk-seeking as there is a reduction in sensitivity to probability.   
After examining the results from both these studies, we can reach some conclusion about the 
influence of temporal delay on risky gambles.  In both domains one side of the gamble is closer to 
zero.  In the loss domain this is the outcome that is sought after, whereas in the gains domain it is not 
the outcome that is sought after.  If an instantiation of temporal distance acts to increase the 
sensitivity to outcome, then for the gains domain both the reduction in sensitivity to probability and 
increase in sensitivity to outcome contribute to the outcome that is sought after.  However in the loss 
domain, a decrease in sensitivity to the probability and an increase in sensitivity in outcome act in a 
conflicting manner as one pushes towards risk-seeking behavior (reduction in sensitivity to 
probability) while the other pushes towards risk-averse behavior (increased sensitivity to outcome).  
The superordinate nature of outcome over probability will result in outcome having a greater effect as 




Analysis of the previous literature has revealed that to our knowledge no research has been 
done exclusively in the loss domain.  Furthermore, any of the studies that did deal in the loss domain 
were completely hypothetical in nature.  From Table 2 below it is evident that the overall consensus 
in the gains domain is that an increase in temporal delay will cause individuals to become more risk-
seeking in the case of risky gambles. 
Domain Experimental Task Context Attitude Rewards Referee 
Gains Choice Gambles Seeking Real (Abdellaoui et 
al., 2011) 
Gains Choice Gambles 
with real 
time delay 
Inconclusive Real (Anderson & 
Stafford, 2009) 
Gains Choice Gambles Seeking Real (Noussair & 
Wu, 2006) 
Gains Matching & Choice Gambles Inconclusive Hypothetical (Ahlbrecht & 
Weber, 1997) 
Gains Choice & Rating Gambles Seeking Hypothetical (Weber & 
Chapman, 
2005) 
Gains Rating Gambles Seeking Hypothetical (Sagristano et 
al., 2002) 
Gains Rating Real World 
Scenarios 
Seeking Hypothetical (Maglio et al., 
2011) 
Mixed Rating Gambles Seeking Hypothetical (Shelley, 1994) 





Hypothesis and Experimental Design 
4.1 Hypothesis 
An introduction of time delay will make people less sensitive to probabilities and more 
sensitive to outcomes in risky choice (Sagristano et al., 2002).  We hypothesize that this will result in 
greater risk aversion in the loss domain as the resolution time of the gamble is increased. We tested 
this hypothesis in two experiment using various preference elicitation methods and both real and 
hypothetical rewards. Next, we will present these studies.  
4.2 Overview of the Studies 
We conducted two studies of risky intertemporal choice in the loss domain.  The primary goal 
of both studies was to test the effects of a temporal delay on risk attitudes.  In order to do this, we 
elicited participants’ certainty equivalents for both real and hypothetical risky choices using paper-
and-pencil as well as oral-based surveys.  The major similarity between the two studies we conducted 
was that for both we carried out between-group analysis on three temporal extensions of immediate, 
future, and far-future resolution of the risky choices.  In the first experiment, subjects went through a 
series of choice questions in order to elicit certainty equivalents for 4 sets of risky gambles with 
varying outcome levels and probabilities.  In the second experiment, subjects went through six pricing 
questions involving various car insurance scenarios also with varying outcome level risk and 
probabilities.  The goal in varying probabilities and outcome level was to produce a larger data set as 
well as gauge any direct effects on risk attitudes or in conjunction with temporal delay.  Additionally, 
the first experiment gave monetary reward based on the choices made as well as class participation 
credit while the second experiment was completely voluntary.  This was done to balance the effects of 
hypothetical versus real rewards and hedge against flaws in experimental design. 
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4.3 Experiment 1 
4.3.1 Design and Procedure 
Experiment 1 was conducted at the University of Waterloo and consisted of a paper-and-
pencil based survey of 176 undergraduate students.  Participants received extra course credit for 
participating in this study.  In addition to the course credit, subjects also participated in a drawing and 
were given a chance to play out one of their choices for real and gain monetary reward based on their 
decisions in the survey.   
We manipulated the delay (i.e., resolution and payment time) in a between-subject fashion.  
There were three conditions: no-delay, 2-week delay, and 2-month delay.  In each condition subjects 
faced a series of risky choices and rating questions in the loss domain.  Subjects were asked to 
imagine which of two losses they would rather undergo; one being a risky loss and the other being a 
sure loss.  Overall, there were 60 choice questions in a total of 4 sets.  Each set looked to find the 
subject’s certainty equivalent by comparing a gamble against an incrementing sure loss for a certain 
delay. For instance, in the choice set taken from the no-delay condition and shown in Table 3, if a 
subject chose the sure loss (Option B) up to question 4 and the risky loss (Option A) thereafter we 
assumed his certainty equivalent for the lottery presented as the Option A lied between -$45 and -$50. 
As $5 is a relatively wide range we asked the subjects in a follow-up question what his exact certainty 
equivalent was.  Subjects were also asked follow-up rating questions from a 0 to 9 scale (0 being not 
important to 9 being very important) on the importance of the probability and amount of loss.  A 
question was also asked about the attractiveness of the gamble as well but the results were not used 
due to a typographical error in the question.  The delay signified when the subject was expected to 
play the lottery. In order to make the time dimension more salient we added a picture of a calendar 




 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision  
A   or   B 
1  
Lose $70 with 80% chance or lose $30 with 20% 
chance TODAY 
 
Lose $30 for sure TODAY  
2 Lose $35 for sure TODAY  
3 Lose $40 for sure TODAY  
4 Lose $45 for sure TODAY  
5 Lose $50 for sure TODAY  
6 Lose $55 for sure TODAY  
7 Lose $60 for sure TODAY  
8 Lose $65 for sure TODAY  
9 Lose $70 for sure TODAY  
Table 3: A Sample Set of Questions from Survey - Experiment 1. 
 
As mentioned in total there were 4 sets of questions.  More specifically there was a high and 
medium risk outcome level (100, 0; 70, 30) crossed with a probability level (80, 20) and its converse.  
This was done to examine any effects probability and outcome level may have on risk attitudes as 
well as strengthen our assertion that changes in time delay plays the primary role in forming risk 
attitudes. 
To provide real incentives we notified the participants that we would randomly select a few 
subjects to actually play out one of their 60 decisions (determined randomly) at the given time by 
giving them a base of 100 Canadian dollars and taking away however much they lost (the max loss 
was 100 Canadian dollars so there was no negative to being chosen).  Then, a series of follow-up 
rating questions were asked such as importance of the probability/amount of loss.  The experiment 
lasted approximately 30 minutes.  The participants were told at the beginning that were no right or 
wrong answers and that the experimenters were only interested in their true preferences.  Refer to 





4.4.1 Overview Results – Experiment 1 
We did not use responses from 56 of the 176 participants as they answered illogically or they 
chose not to complete the entire survey. Hence, the following analysis is based upon the response of 
the remaining 120 participants.  The primary focus was to examine how risk attitudes alter when the 
temporal delay changes.  In this case, from an initial observation there seems to be some notable 
differences in risk attitudes between the no-delay and 2-week/2-month delay conditions but little 
difference between the latter two.  The following table shows percentages of risk attitudes observed in 
each choice set and in each condition.  These were obtained by looking at the certainty equivalent for 
all subjects in each choice set and comparing it to the expected value of the respective choice set.  For 
instance, choice set 1 had an expected value of -$80.  If the subjects would pay less than $80 for this 
gamble they would be coded as risk-seeking, if they would pay more than $80 they would be coded as 
risk-averse, and if they would pay exactly $80 they would be coded as risk-neutral. 
Choice Set Risk Attitude No-delay, n = 31 2-week Delay, n = 44 2-month Delay, n = 45 
1 (EV = -80) Seeking 80.6 75 80 
Neutral 16.1  22.7 20 
Averse 3.2 2.3 0 
2 (EV = -20) Seeking 22.6 23 33.3 
Neutral 54.8 29 22.3 
Averse 22.6 48 44.4 
3 (EV = -62) Seeking 93.5 91 95.6 
Neutral 6.5 4.5 2.2 
Averse 0 4.5 2.2 
4 (EV = -38) Seeking 61.3 34.1 46.7 
Neutral 6.5 4.5 0 
Averse 32.3 61.4 53.3 
Table 4: Risk Attitude Percentages for Subjects in each Choice Set – Experiment 1. 
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In Table 4 above it is observed that for choice sets 2, 3, and 4 subjects become more risk-
averse when comparing the no-delay group to the 2-week delay group and the 2-month delay group 
respectively.  In choice sets 1, 2, and 3 risk-seeking is relatively constant between groups whereas in 
choice set 4 it increases when comparing no-delay to 2-week and 2-month delay respectively.  It is 
also relevant that there appears to be little overall difference between the 2-week delay and 2-month 
delay group for all risk attitudes in all choice sets. 
Additionally, it is interesting to note that the choice sets with lower magnitude expected 
values (2 and 4) have a significantly larger percentage of risk-averse individuals while the choice sets 
with higher magnitude expected values (1 and 3) have a significantly larger percentage of risk-
seeking individuals contradicting the peanuts effect (Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991). 
In the next table, there is an examination of the average certainty equivalents in losses for 
each choice set and condition.  Here, a comparison of the points verifies that the certainty equivalents 
have gone up with the delay which equates to subjects becoming more risk-averse.    
Choice Set No-delay, n = 31 
(std. deviation) 
2-week Delay, n = 44 
(std. deviation) 
2-month Delay, n= 45 
(std. deviation) 


































It is evident from Table 5 above that the certainty equivalents are going up when comparing 
the no delay group to the 2-week and 2-month delay group.  Although in all choice sets there is an 
increase in the CE from the no-delay group to the 2-week and 2-month respectively, the certainty 
equivalent for the 2-week compared to the 2-month group appears to be slightly decreasing in all 
choice sets which is contradictory to the hypothesis. 
The following graph shows a visual representation of the overall risk attitude percentages 
across all the choice sets.  Essentially, it is the average of Table 4 in graphical format.  In this case, 
we want to confirm the results from Table 5 and get a better understanding of the overall risk attitude 
behavior across the conditions. 
 
 
Figure 3: Overall Risk Attitude Visual Representation – Experiment 1. 
 
After examining the visual representation of overall risk attitudes for the 4 sets in Figure 3 
above, it is verified that subjects become slightly more risk-averse when moving from the no-delay 
group to the 2-week and 2-month delay group.  However, risk-aversion appears to remain constant 
between the 2-week and 2-month delay group.  Also, risk-seeking becomes slightly more prevalent in 
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4.4.2 Choice Question Results – Experiment 1 
A 3 (time) by 2 (probability) by 2 (outcome) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted for the 
certainty equivalents.  Time was a between-subject variable while probability and outcome which 
were within-subject variables.  The following table shows the main effects of time, outcome, and 
probability interactions. 
Effect df Mean Square F p 
Time 2 807.154 3.044 > 0.05 
Outcome 1 158.349 1.230 > 0.05 
Outcome x Time 2 186.886 1.452 > 0.05 
Probability  1 73961.429 519.019 < 0.001 
Probability x Time 2 14.358 0.101 > 0.05 
Outcome x Probability 1 19543.001 285.524 < 0.001 
Outcome x Time x Probability  2 42.490 0.621 > 0.05 
Error 117 265.165   
Table 6: Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance – Experiment 1.  
 
The main effect of time approached significance as F (2, 117) = 3.044, p = 0.052.  Results 
indicate that this was in the direction of the hypothesis as there was an overall increase in certainty 
equivalent from the no-delay condition (M = 41.5965, SD = 8.30748) to the 2-week (M = 46.2784, SD 
= 9.03195) and 2-month condition (M = 44.7611, SD = 7.03541) respectively.  However as the 2-
week and 2-month condition exhibited similar overall certainty equivalents, the effect only 
approached significance rather than actually being significant.  The main effect of probability was 
also significant as F (1, 117) = 73961.43, p < 0.001.  Only the interaction effect of outcome and 
probability was significant, F (1, 117) = 19543.001, p < 0.001. 
Further contrast tests were used to break down the effect of time and look at the interaction 
between each respective pair of delay groups.  A contrast is a weighted sum of means that allows the 
examination of differences between the conditions.  It is possible to see not only if the results are 
significant, but to test the research hypothesis and see if an increased time delay resulted in an 
increase in risk aversion.  The contrasts comparisons were as follows in Table 7 below: Contrast 1 
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was the comparison between condition 1 (no-delay) and condition 2 (2-week delay).  Contrast 2 was 
the comparison between condition 1 (no-delay) and condition 3 (2-month delay).  Contrast 3 was the 
comparison between condition 2 (2-week delay) and condition 3 (2-month delay). 




1 -4.6820 1.90920 -2.452 117 .016 
2 -3.1647 1.90041 -1.665 117 .099 
3 1.5173 1.72620 .879 117 .381 
Does not assume 
equal variances 
1 -4.6820 2.01997 -2.318 67.913 .023 
2 -3.1647 1.82379 -1.735 57.412 .088 
3 1.5173 1.71870 .883 81.219 .380 
Table 7: Contrast Tests between all combinations of no-delay, 2-week delay, and 2-month delay 
groups – Experiment 1. 
 
Since Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances was not significant (p > 0.05), the part 
labeled assume equal variances in Table 7 was used.  This gave the weighted sum of the group means 
or the value of the contrast itself.  This was acquired by multiplying each group mean by the weight 
for the specific contrast and then taking the summation of all the products.  In this case it appears that 
only contrast 1 or the no-delay with 2-week comparison was significant as t (117) = -2.452, p = 0.016 
in the direction stated by the hypothesis as there is an increase in the certainty equivalent from the no-
delay condition (M = 41.5965, SD = 8.30748) to the 2-week (M = 46.2784, SD = 9.03195) indicating 
greater risk aversion. 
4.4.3 Rating Question Results – Experiment 1 
We also conducted a 3 (time) by 2 (probability) by 2 (outcome) mixed-model ANOVA for 
the follow-up rating questions.  Again, time was a between-subject variable while probability and 
outcome which were within-subject variables.  The rating questions were asked in order identify the 
influence of probability and outcome in the decision making process for the 3 delay conditions.  The 
other rating question regarding the attractiveness of the gamble was worded incorrectly and thus the 
results for that case have been omitted.  The subsequent table shows the average response for the 
Probability Rating Question observed in each choice set and each condition. 
 
 34 
Choice Set No-delay, n = 31 
(std. deviation) 
2-week Delay, n = 44 
(std. deviation) 
2-month Delay, n= 45 
(std. deviation) 






























Table 8: Descriptive Statistics for Probability Rating Question – Experiment 1. 
 
From Table 8 above it is observed that there are little to no patterns within the choice sets as 
well as between the choice sets for the Probability Rating Question.  Thus, it is expected the results 
will not be significant.  From a mixed-model ANOVA it is verified as the main effect of time is not 
significant as F (2, 117) = 2.338, p > 0.05.  Furthermore none of the other effects are significant as p 
> 0.05 for the other main effects of probability and outcome as well as all the interactions. 
 The next table shows the average response for the Outcome Rating Question observed in each 
choice set and each condition. 
Choice Set No-delay, n = 31 
(std. deviation) 
2-week Delay, n = 44 
(std. deviation) 
2-month Delay, n= 45 
(std. deviation) 
































Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Outcome Rating Question – Experiment 1. 
 
From Table 9 above it is observed that there is a very slight overall decrease within the choice 
sets as the time delay goes up for Outcome Rating Question.  However the change is subtle and it is 
still expected the results will not be significant.  From a mixed-model ANOVA it is verified as the 
main effect of time is not significant as F (2, 117) = 0.908, p > 0.05.  The main effect of probability is 
significant as F (2, 117) = 7.690, p < 0.01 but none of the interactions are as well as the other main 
effect of outcome and any of its interactions. 
4.5 Discussion – Experiment 1 
The rationale behind the choice questions was to elicit the subject’s certainty equivalent for 
specific sets of gambles (set 1, 2, 3, and 4).  In order to combat anchoring or any other adjustment 
bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) the subjects were first asked to indicate their switching point by 
going through a table where the sure amount of loss incremented by $5 and the risky gamble 
remained the same.  A follow-up question was then asked directly to verify the certainty equivalent.  
These two were cross-checked to ensure rational thinking.  Results that did not match were thrown 
out as illogical data as the participant either did not understand the task or chose to not complete the 
survey in a logical manner.  56 of a total of 176 participants either did not complete the entire survey 
or had illogical answers and thus their responses were not used.  For example, if a subject’s response 
in set 1 showed that he/she preferred Option B up to question number 10 and then Option A from 
question 11 to 21, their certainty equivalent would have to be between the bounds of the certain 
amount in those two questions.  In this case, that would correspond to answering that their certainty 
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equivalent to be between -$45 and -$50.  Then based on their certainty equivalent, there would be a 
between subject analysis of the 3 conditions of no-delay, 2-week delay, and 2-month delay.   
The results indicate that there was a significant difference between the no-delay and 2-week 
group; however, not for the no-delay and 2-month group as well as the 2-week and 2-month delay 
group.  It is important to note that this is not a test of a general hypothesis that one group will differ 
from the other, which would be two-tailed and likewise correspond to the given significant levels.  
Rather, the hypothesis predicts that the introduction of time delay will make people less sensitive to 
probabilities and more sensitive to outcomes, and as a result make them more risk-averse (which 
corresponds to a higher certainty equivalent).  This corresponds to a one-tailed hypothesis and thus 
we can divide the corresponding significant levels by 2.  Thus for contrast 1: p = 0.016/2=0.008, for 
contrast 2: p = 0.099/2 = 0.05, and for contrast 3: p = 0.381/2 = 0.1905 indicating significance in 
actually both contrast 1 and 2 but not in 3. 
The hypothesis predicts that all the contrasts will be significant.  It is unexpected that the 2-
week delay condition has a greater overall mean than the 2-month delay condition because that 
implies that the certainty equivalent for the 2-month delay group was less than 2-week delay group or 
in other words the 2-week delay group was more risk-averse than the 2-month delay group.  It is also 
unexpected that contrast 3 is not significant implying that the temporal difference of 2 weeks and 2 
months had no effect on subjects’ risk aversion.  Both of these could be attributed to the possibility 
that the participants did not distinguish between 2 weeks and 2 months and just grouped the two as in 
the future versus the no-delay group of being in the present.  In summary, the contrasts reveal that 
there is significant difference between the no-delay group with the 2-week delay group as well as the 
no-delay with 2-month delay group corresponding in the direction the hypothesis predicts (more risk-
averse in the far-future), but no significant difference between the 2-week delay group and the 2-
month delay group.  
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The rating questions were designed with the notion of examining the superordinate versus 
subordinate nature of amount versus probability respectively (Sagristano et al., 2002).  It was 
expected that as the temporal delay increased, there would be a larger concern with the amount of loss 
in comparison to the probability involved.  For Question (1-4)C [“How important was the probability 
of loss in your decisions on a scale of 0 to 9 (0 being not important at all and 9 being very 
important)?] it was hypothesized that the no-delay group would show the most concern and put the 
highest rating followed by the 2-week delay group and finally the 2-month delay group.  Likewise, 
for Question (1-4)D [“How important was the amount of loss in your decisions on a scale of 0 to 9 (0 
being not important at all and 9 being very important)?] it was expected that the 2-month delay group 
would put the highest rating followed by the 2-week delay group and finally the no-delay group. 
However, both rating question C and D were not significant.  This could be attributed to many factors 
such as the subjects not having much incentive to give real answers to them not accurately being able 
to quantify how attractive the probabilities or outcomes were. 
For Question (1-4)B [“How unattractive was Option B in this decision on a scale of 0 to 9 (0 
being not unattractive at all and 9 being very unattractive)?] Option B was meant to be Option A.  
Due to a last minute change to the table the two got mixed up.  Had it said Option A, it was 
anticipated that a higher temporal delay would result in greater risk aversion compared to a lower 
temporal delay due to the preoccupation on outcome over probability in the long run. 
4.6 Experiment 2 
4.6.1 Design and Procedure 
Experiment 2 was conducted at the University of Waterloo and consisted of an oral-based 
survey of various undergraduate and graduate students conducted at the campus student life center.  
Unlike experiment 1, experiment 2 was completely hypothetical offering no incentives for 
completion.  The major reasoning behind this was to combat framing the problem in the gains domain 
 
 38 
that maybe have occurred in experiment 1 as a result of endowing them with monetary incentives 
(Kahneman et al., 1991).   Subjects were asked to imagine hypothetical losses in car rental for a one 
day trip.  Like experiment 1, experiment 2 was broken up into 3 conditions.  The first condition 
imagined they would be renting the car for today, the second condition for a day in 2 months, and the 
third condition for a day in 1 year.  Each condition consisted of 25 participants for a total of 75 
participants.  Subjects were asked to decide on the maximum amount of money they would be willing 
to spend purchase different types of insurances (or in other words identify their certainty equivalents).  
The insurance scenarios were generalized into 3 probability sets: low (0.1), medium (0.5), and high 
(0.9).  The potential loss was kept constant at $200 and then $2000 across all probability sets for a 
total of 6 questions.  Figure 4 below shows an example of the low probability set questions for the 1-
year delay condition.  Refer to Appendix E-G for more details on the survey. 
Scenario 1a: You are renting a car in 1-year and are offered a breakdown insurance that will cover an auto 
repair service man coming out to fix your car in the case of an engine malfunction.  Suppose you know from 
the National Motorists Association that there is a 10% chance that the car will breakdown.  If you do not buy 
the insurance and the car breaks down it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 1b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if the car breaks down (the probability remains the 
same). 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 




4.7.1 Overview Results – Experiment 2 
Like experiment 1, the primary focus was to examine how risk attitudes alter when the 
temporal delay changes.  In this case, from a preliminary observation there seems to be some notable 
differences in risk attitudes between all three delay groups.  The following table shows percentages of 
risk attitudes observed over all questions in each condition.  These were obtained by looking at the 
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certainty equivalents for all subjects in each question and then comparing it to the expected value of 
the respective question.  For instance, the first question had an expected value of -$20.  If the subjects 
would pay less than $20 for the insurance they would be identified as risk-seeking, if they would pay 
more than $20 they would be identified as risk-averse, and if they would pay exactly $20 they would 
be identified as risk-neutral. The participants would then be coded as risk-seeking, neutral, or averse 
based on the attitude they displayed for the majority of the questions (ties were broken by using a 
comparison of the overall certainty equivalent with the overall expected value of all six questions). 
 Risk Attitude No-delay 2-month Delay 1-year Delay 
Overall Mean Seeking 84 72 51.3 
Neutral 11.3 22.7 29.3 
Averse 4.67 5.33 19.3 
Table 10: Risk Attitude Percentages for Subjects over all 6 Questions – Experiment 2. 
 
In Table 10 above it is observed that as the temporal delay increases, the subjects are 
becoming more and more risk-averse.  The trend looks to be significant as across temporal conditions 
there is a decrease in the number of risk-seeking responses and an increase in both risk-neutral and 
risk-averse responses. 
In the next table, there is an examination of the average certainty equivalents for all 6 
questions.  Here, a comparison of the points verifies that the certainty equivalents have gone up with 








Question No-delay, n = 25 
(std. deviation) 
2-month Delay, n = 25 
(std. deviation) 
1-year Delay, n= 25 
(std. deviation) 














































Table 11: Descriptive Statistics for Certainty Equivalents – Experiment 2. 
 
It is evident from Table 11 above that the certainty equivalents are going up as the temporal 
delay increases for all the questions.  This trend is prevalent across all the questions which points to 
the results being significant in the direction of the hypothesis. 
The following graph shows a visual representation of the risk attitude percentages for all 6 
questions across all conditions.  Essentially, it is Table 10 in graphical format.  In this case, the graph 
should represent a distinct trend of subjects becoming more risk-averse and less risk-seeking as the 
delay goes up across the 3 groups.  It will also help in identifying in other trends that may not have 




Figure 5: Overall Risk Attitude Visual Representation – Experiment 2. 
 
After examining the visual representation of the subjects’ risk attitudes across all 6 questions, 
it is evident that subjects are becoming more risk-averse as the delay increases.  Unlike experiment 1, 
the risk aversion is not constant between the two future delay groups (in this case 2-month and 1-year 
delay respectively), but rather is increasing as a function of time.  This is in accord with the 
hypothesis and is expected to be highly significant from the preliminary observation. 
4.8 Certainty Equivalent Results – Experiment 2 
A 3 (time) by 3 (probability) by 2 (outcome level) mixed-model ANOVA was conducted for 
the certainty equivalents.  Time was a between-subject variable while probability and outcome which 

















No-Delay 2-Month Delay 1-Year Delay






Effect df Mean Square F p 
Time 2 612726.536 13.152 < 0.001 
Outcome 1 57118809.620 1699.083 < 0.001 
Outcome x Time 2 418470.540 12.448 < 0.001 
Probability  1 36699617.280 1679.352 < 0.001 
Probability x Time 2 215266.870 9.850 < 0.001 
Outcome x Probability 1 24013117.920 1445.132 < 0.001 
Outcome x Time x Probability  2 151427.190 9.113 < 0.001 
Error 72 46587.755   
Table 12: Repeated Measures Analysis of Variance – Experiment 2. 
 
The main effect of time was highly significant as F (2, 72) = 13.152, p < 0.001.  Results 
indicate that this was in the direction of the hypothesis as there was an overall increase in certainty 
equivalent from the no-delay condition (M = 377.5933, SD = 111.63378) to the 2-month (M = 
443.4000, SD = 70.49306) and subsequently to the 1-year condition (M = 505.4000, SD = 76.56701).   
Also, the main effect of probability and outcome were highly significant as F (1, 72) = 1679.352, p < 
0.001 and F (1, 72) = 1699.083, p < 0.001 respectively.  In this case higher probabilities led to higher 
certainty equivalents (low prob: M = 95.720, SD = 2.986, med. prob: M = 435.433, SD = 13.850, high 
prob: M = 795.240, SD =18.179) and higher outcomes led to higher certainty equivalents (low 
outcome: M = 85.858, SD = 1.905, high outcome: M = 798.404, SD = 18.784).  All the interaction 
effects were also statistically significant at the 0.001 significance level and thus it was necessary to 
carry out post hoc procedure to further examine the effect of time upon risk attitudes. 
Additional contrast tests were used to break down the effect of time and look at the 
interaction between each respective pair of temporal delay groups.  The contrasts comparisons were 
as follows in Table 13 below: Contrast 1 was the comparison between condition 1 (no-delay) and 
condition 2 (2-month delay).  Contrast 2 was the comparison between condition 1 (no-delay) and 
condition 3 (1-year delay).  Contrast 3 was the comparison between condition 2 (2-month delay) and 








1 -65.8067 24.92328 -2.640 72 .010 
2 -127.8067 24.92328 -5.128 72 .000 
3 -62.0000 24.92328 -2.488 72 .015 
Does not assume 
equal variances 
1 -65.8067 26.40558 -2.492 40.514 .017 
2 -127.8067 27.07368 -4.721 42.489 .000 
3 -62.0000 20.81517 -2.979 47.676 .005 
Table 13: Contrast Tests between all combinations of no-delay, 2-month delay, and 1-year delay 
groups – Experiment 2. 
 
Since Levene’s test of homogeneity of variances was not significant (p > 0.05), the part 
labeled assume equal variances in Table 13 was used.  It his case all of the contrasts were significant, 
contrast 1: t (72) = -2.640, p < 0.05, contrast 2: t (72) = -5.128, p < 0.001, contrast 3: t (72) = -2.488, 
p < 0.05.  Furthermore this was in the direction of the hypothesis as there was an increase in certainty 
equivalent from the no-delay condition (M = 377.5933, SD = 111.63378) to the 2-month (M = 
443.4000, SD = 70.49306) and subsequently to the 1-year condition (M = 505.4000, SD = 76.56701) 
indicating increased risk aversion over time.  It also makes sense that contrast 3 was highly 
significant whereas the other contrasts were only significant as it was comparing the largest temporal 
distance of no-delay versus 1-year delay.  
4.9 Discussion – Experiment 2 
The rationale behind experiment 2 was similar to experiment 1 in that it was to elicit the 
subject’s certainty equivalent for specific gambles (Q1A, Q1B, Q2A, Q2B, Q3A, Q3C).  One of the 
major motivations was to increase the temporal distance in order for subjects to be able to distinguish 
between far-future distances.  In experiment 1, the temporal distance of 2 weeks compared with 2 
months did not provide significant results.  Thus, in order to test the hypothesis, it was necessary to 
re-examine the temporal distance and increase the time to test if there was indeed any difference. 
 Also, another motivation was to make the study hypothetical to combat any sort of framing in 
the gains domain as a result of providing a monetary reward based on the decision made.  The 
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subjects may have just framed the entire study in experiment 1 and acted similar to how they might 
act in the gains domain rather than the loss domain exclusively. 
The results indicate that all the contrasts were significant in the direction the hypothesis 
predicts (more risk-averse as the temporal delay increases).  Unlike experiment 1, in experiment 2, 
contrast 3 or the contrast which compared the two far-future conditions (2 weeks vs. 2 months for 
experiment 1 and 2 months vs. 1 year for experiment 2) was significant.  Furthermore, the overall 
certainty equivalent increased as the temporal distance increased for the 3 conditions which is in line 





5.1 General  
This study has found that there is a significant relationship between the time of resolution for 
a risky gamble in the loss domain and the level of risk aversion. Previous literature has found that 
people are generally risk-seeking in the loss domain (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). The results of this study have shown that as the delay to outcome increases, the 
degree of risk-seeking diminishes. This result is in accord with previous literature that looked at risk 
attitudes in the gains domain. While people are generally risk-averse in the gains domain, the degree 
of risk aversion diminishes with delay (Noussair & Wu, 2006; Sagristano et al., 2002). While risk 
attitudes differed distinguishably between immediate and future gambles, the change between two 
future delays depended on the difference between two future delays. Although in experiment 1 
attitude towards risk did not change between two delay conditions- probably due to the proximity of 
the delay in the future conditions-, experiment 2 verified our conjecture by increasing the delay 
difference between two future conditions.  Thus, the general finding is in line with our hypothesis that 
as the temporal distance increases for the resolution of risky gamble in the loss domain, decision 
makers will become more risk-averse.  In regards to the influence of delay on the importance or 
weight of probabilities and outcomes, we were not able to find that the increase in risk aversion was 
due to subjects focusing more on outcomes and less on probabilities as the temporal delay increased.  
I tried to provide evidence for the underlying mechanism by directly asking subjects how important 
probability and outcome dimensions were in their decisions. However, even if temporal distance 
might have influenced how the subjects treat these two dimensions, they may not have been 
consciously aware of this effect. Hence, on the subconscious level it could still be the correct 




The major limitation of this study is conceptual.  Inherently, it is difficult to mimic loss in 
experimental settings as subjects cannot face real losses.  In experiment 1, real world incentives were 
given to try to make subjects answer more truthfully.  However in order to do this, it was necessary to 
give everyone a base of money that we would take away from (see Appendix B-D for more details) to 
mimic loss.  In doing so, this could have shifted the thought process into the gains domain.  For 
instance in Option A for choice set 1, rather than losing $100 with 80% chance or losing nothing with 
20% chance, it could have been interpreted as getting $0 (100-100) with 80% chance or $100 (100-0) 
with 20% chance.  In addition, subjects may have been prone to the endowment effect (Kahneman et 
al., 1991) which would make them overvalue the $100 and subsequently treat it differently had the 
loss just been a part of their normal assets.  Unfortunately, it is difficult to create a study where the 
premise depends on the subjects paying the experimenters, which is a major contributing factor to 
why the literature on risky intertemporal choice is much less comprehensive in the loss domain than 
the gains.  
5.3 Future Research  
Future research is necessary to verify the effects of temporal delay on gamble resolution time 
to accurately gauge the level of risk aversion.  The inconsistencies between contrast 3 in experiment 1 
and 2 makes it somewhat unclear how long the delays should be in order to alter risk attitudes.  It 
would be ideal if the experiment could be recreated in a real life context where subjects would be 
using their own assets so as to combat various problems such as framing in the gains domain or any 
sort of endowment effects.  It would also be ideal to look at many more temporal delays and 
probability levels to accurately see how much participants were discounting and subsequently risk 
attitudes between the various groups. 
 Additionally, it would be interesting to broaden the spectrum of participants outside of 
strictly university students.  Trends may emerge based on age, gender, and/or socioeconomic factors.  
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Little research has been done in the realm of risky intertemporal choice in this regard in both the loss 
and gains domains and it may be worth pursuing.   
The limited pool of participants also acted as somewhat of a hindrance to the overall findings.  
The study was relatively small in that for experiment 1 approximately only 40 subjects made up each 
of 3 groups, while in experiment 2 only 25 subjects made up each of 3 groups.  An increase in the 
number of participants would increase the power of the study and cement the overall findings. 
Lastly, the lack of significant results from the rating questions in experiment 1 is worth 
revisiting.  Whether it is the question wording or the overall design of the survey, there must be a way 
to obtain significant answers in order to verify that outcome is focused on more than probability as 
the temporal delay increases.
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Appendix A 
Experiment 1: Information & Consent Form 
Date:  November 23, 2011 
Title of Project: Risky Intertemporal Choice in the Loss Domain 
Faculty Supervisors: Selcuk Onay, selcuk.onay@uwaterloo.ca 
 
Student Investigators: Kimiyoshi Oshikoji, k2oshiko@uwaterloo.ca 
 
Study Overview 
I am a Master’s student in the Department of Management Sciences at the University of 
Waterloo conducting research under the supervision of Professor Selcuk Onay. 
 
You are invited to participate in a study assessing the effects of time on risky decision 
making in the loss domain.  
What You Will Be Asked to Do 
You will be asked a series of choice questions about your preference between a sure 
and risky loss.  Please note that there are no right or wrong answers.  We are only interested 
in your preferences.  There are 60 questions regarding a choice between two losses.  You will 
also be asked a few questions about your feeling regarding the choices you have made.  The 
whole survey should take about 15-30 minutes. 
 
A few of you will also be asked for permission to contact you for a second session.  If 
you are selected for consideration in this second session you will be asked to play out one of 
the 60 questions from the first session (all of which have equal chance of being randomly 
chosen).  You will be provided with a base of 100 dollars and receive money based on the 
choice you have made and how it plays out. 
 
For example if the question we chose to use is a choice between: 
 
Lose $50 for sure (Option A) vs.  
Lose $40 with 70% chance or $70 with 30% chance (Option B) 
 
and you chose Option A, then you will get $50.  Likewise if you chose Option B we will play 
out the choice in front of you and you will have a 70% chance of getting $60 ($100-$40) or a 
30% chance of getting $30 ($100-$70). 
The amount received is taxable.  It is your responsibility to report this amount for income tax 
purposes. 
Participation and Remuneration 
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Participation in this study is voluntary, and will take approximately 30 minutes of your 
time. You will receive 0.5 bonus points for MSCI 211. 
You may decline to answer any questions presented during the study if you so wish.  A 
decision to participate or not will not impact your grade in MSCI 211.  If you choose not to 
participate in the study and wish to obtain a 0.5 bonus mark you will perform a task assigned 
by the TA.  You may also withdraw from the study at any time by not completing the survey 
and you will still receive the 0.5 bonus mark.  
Personal Benefits of the Study 
The benefits of participation in this study include learning about research in risky decision 
making in the loss domain.  You will receive additional background information about the 
study once the results have been gathered.  There are no other personal benefits to 
participation. 
Risks to Participation in the Study 
We want you to be aware of the possible risks/side effects associated with participation in 
this research.  You will be asked to imagine having to lose money for sure or with a certain 
probability.  In the event that you develop any negative reactions, or are concerned that you 
may, please contact the researcher, Kimiyoshi Oshikoji at k2oshiko@uwaterloo.ca.  You 
may also contact Professor Selcuk Onay at selcuk.onay@uwaterloo.ca or the University of 
Waterloo Counselling Services at 519-888-4567 x32655.   
Confidentiality 
All information you provide is considered completely confidential; indeed, your name will 
not be included or in any other way associated, with the data collected in the 
study.  Furthermore, because the interest of this study is in the average responses of the entire 
group of participants, you will not be identified individually in any written reports of this 
research.  Data obtained from the surveys will promptly be entered into Excel and 
participants will be identified as numerical entries.  The hard copies of the surveys will be 
securely stored in CPH 3626 and promptly shredded after no more than 2-months.  The 
electronic data may be kept indefinitely as they will no longer contain any personal 
identifiers.  
Questions and Research Ethics Clearance 
If you have any questions about this study, or would like additional information to assist you 
in reaching a decision about participation, please feel free to ask the student investigator 
listed at the top of the sheet. 
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I would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance 
through the Office of Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo. However, the final 
decision about participation is yours. If you have any comments or concerns resulting from 
your participation in this study, please contact Dr. Susan Sykes at this office at 519-888-4567 
Ext. 36005 or ssykes@uwaterloo.ca. 
Thank you for your interest in our research and for your assistance with this project. 
 Consent of Participant 
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being conducted 
by Kimiyoshi Oshikoji under the supervision of Professor Selcuk Onay of the Department of 
Management Sciences at the University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask any 
questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any 
additional details I wanted. I am aware that I may withdraw from the study without loss of 
participation credit at any time by advising the researchers of this decision.   
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through, the Office of 
Research Ethics at the University of Waterloo.  I was informed that if I have any comments 
or concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact Susan Sykes, the 
Director of the Office of Research Ethics at 519-888-4567 ext. 36005 or 
ssykes@uwaterloo.ca.  
With full knowledge of all foregoing, I agree, of my own free will, to participate in this 
study. 
_____________________________________   
Print Name 
_____________________________________ 
Signature of Participant 
_____________________________________  






Experiment 1: Zero Delay Questionnaire 
Instructions: 
 
This is a study in risky decision making.  You will be answering a series of choice questions about 
your preference between a sure and risky loss.  Please note that there are no right or wrong answers.  We are 
only interested in your preferences.  You will be asked 60 questions regarding a choice between two losses.  
You will also be asked a few questions about your feeling regarding the choices you have made.  The whole 
survey should take from 15-30 minutes.   
 
In the questions you’ll be answering Option A will always represent a risky loss while Option B will 
represent a sure loss.   
For example one of your choices could be: 
 
Option A: Lose $90 with 80% chance or $10 with 20% chance vs. 
Option B: Lose $50 for sure  
 
As an incentive to make realistic decisions, we will choose a few of you randomly out of the entire 
pool of participants to receive a monetary reward by actually playing out one of the 60 questions you have 
answered. We will do this by providing you with a base of $100 dollars and then taking away however much is 
decided by your choice.  Then we will pick one of the 60 questions you have answered randomly and proceed to 
play out the choice in front of you. If your choice is the sure loss in that question you’ll simply be paid the 
difference between $100 and the amount you decided to lose for sure. If, on the other hand, you’ve chosen the 
risky option in that question, we will resolve that uncertainty using a random number generator to determine 
your gains.  
 
For instance, in the example above, say you were chosen to play out one choice and we randomly 
selected that choice question to play out.  Then you would get $50 if you chose Option B. If in this particular 
question if you’ve chosen Option A, we will actually play this choice out using a random number generator and 
depending on the outcome you will either lose $90 or $10 and be paid $10 or $90 respectively.   
 
We will contact you if you are one of the few that will actually play out one of your choices and gains 
a monetary reward to come see us today (November 24, 2011).  Hence, make your choices as if you were 
losing the money today (November 24, 2011).  If you do not want to be contacted please just provide us with 
your name so you can receive your 0.5 bonus marks.  However, if you are interested in having a chance at 











Choice Set 1.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 21 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision 
A   or    B 
1  
 










Lose $0 for sure TODAY  
2 Lose $5 for sure TODAY  
3 Lose $10 for sure TODAY  
4 Lose $15 for sure TODAY  
5 Lose $20 for sure TODAY  
6 Lose $25 for sure TODAY  
7 Lose $30 for sure TODAY  
8 Lose $35 for sure TODAY  
9 Lose $40 for sure TODAY  
10 Lose $45 for sure TODAY  
11 Lose $50 for sure TODAY  
12 Lose $55 for sure TODAY  
13 Lose $60 for sure TODAY  
14 Lose $65 for sure TODAY  
15 Lose $70 for sure TODAY  
16 Lose $75 for sure TODAY  
17 Lose $80 for sure TODAY  
18 Lose $85 for sure TODAY  
19 Lose $90 for sure TODAY  
20 Lose $95 for sure TODAY  
21 Lose $100 for sure TODAY  
 
Question 1A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $100 with 80% 
chance or $0 with 20% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $100 with 80% chance. 
 
Question 1B.   





Question 1C.  





Question 1D.  






Choice Set 2.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 21 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision 
A   or    B 
1  
 










Lose $0 for sure TODAY  
2 Lose $5 for sure TODAY  
3 Lose $10 for sure TODAY  
4 Lose $15 for sure TODAY  
5 Lose $20 for sure TODAY  
6 Lose $25 for sure TODAY  
7 Lose $30 for sure TODAY  
8 Lose $35 for sure TODAY  
9 Lose $40 for sure TODAY  
10 Lose $45 for sure TODAY  
11 Lose $50 for sure TODAY  
12 Lose $55 for sure TODAY  
13 Lose $60 for sure TODAY  
14 Lose $65 for sure TODAY  
15 Lose $70 for sure TODAY  
16 Lose $75 for sure TODAY  
17 Lose $80 for sure TODAY  
18 Lose $85 for sure TODAY  
19 Lose $90 for sure TODAY  
20 Lose $95 for sure TODAY  
21 Lose $100 for sure TODAY  
 
Question 2A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $100 with 20% 
chance or $0 with 80% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $100 with 20% chance. 
 
Question 2B.   





Question 2C.  





Question 2D.  






Choice Set 3.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B n in each of 9 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision  
A   or   B 
1  
Lose $70 with 80% chance or lose $30 with 20% 
chance TODAY 
 
Lose $30 for sure TODAY  
2 Lose $35 for sure TODAY  
3 Lose $40 for sure TODAY  
4 Lose $45 for sure TODAY  
5 Lose $50 for sure TODAY  
6 Lose $55 for sure TODAY  
7 Lose $60 for sure TODAY  
8 Lose $65 for sure TODAY  
9 Lose $70 for sure TODAY  
 
Question 3A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $70 with 80% 
chance or $30 with 20% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $70 with 80% chance or lose $30 with 20% 
chance. 
 
Question 3B.   





Question 3C.  





Question 3D.  








Choice Set 4.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 9 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision  
A   or   B 
1  
Lose $70 with 20% chance or lose $30 with 80% 
chance TODAY 
 
Lose $30 for sure TODAY  
2 Lose $35 for sure TODAY  
3 Lose $40 for sure TODAY  
4 Lose $45 for sure TODAY  
5 Lose $50 for sure TODAY  
6 Lose $55 for sure TODAY  
7 Lose $60 for sure TODAY  
8 Lose $65 for sure TODAY  
9 Lose $70 for sure TODAY  
 
 
Question 4A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $70 with 20% 
chance or $30 with 80% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $70 with 20% chance or lose $30 with 80% 
chance. 
 
Question 4B.   





Question 4C.  





Question 4D.  










Experiment 1: 2-week Delay Questionnaire 
Instructions: 
 
This is a study in risky decision making.  You will be answering a series of choice questions about 
your preference between a sure and risky loss.  Please note that there are no right or wrong answers.  We are 
only interested in your preferences.  You will be asked 60 questions regarding a choice between two losses.  
You will also be asked a few questions about your feeling regarding the choices you have made.  The whole 
survey should take from 15-30 minutes.   
 
In the questions you’ll be answering Option A will always represent a risky loss while Option B will 
represent a sure loss.   
For example one of your choices could be: 
 
Option A: Lose $90 with 80% chance or $10 with 20% chance vs. 
Option B: Lose $50 for sure  
 
As an incentive to make realistic decisions, we will choose a few of you randomly out of the entire 
pool of participants to receive a monetary reward by actually playing out one of the 60 questions you have 
answered. We will do this by providing you with a base of $100 dollars and then taking away however much is 
decided by your choice.  Then we will pick one of the 60 questions you have answered randomly and proceed to 
play out the choice in front of you. If your choice is the sure loss in that question you’ll simply be paid the 
difference between $100 and the amount you decided to lose for sure. If, on the other hand, you’ve chosen the 
risky option in that question, we will resolve that uncertainty using a random number generator to determine 
your gains.  
 
For instance, in the example above, say you were chosen to play out one choice and we randomly 
selected that choice question to play out.  Then you would get $50 if you chose Option B. If in this particular 
question if you’ve chosen Option A, we will actually play this choice out using a random number generator and 
depending on the outcome you will either lose $90 or $10 and be paid $10 or $90 respectively.   
 
We will contact you if you are one of the few that will actually play out one of your choices and gains 
a monetary reward to come see us in two weeks (December 7, 2011).  Hence, make your choices as if you were 
losing the money in two weeks (December 7, 2011).  If you do not want to be contacted please just provide us 
with your name so you can receive your 0.5 bonus marks.  However, if you are interested in having a chance at 









Choice Set 1.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 21 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision 
A   or    B 
1  
 
Lose $100 with 80% chance or lose nothing with 20% 









Lose $0 for sure in 2-weeks  
2 Lose $5 for sure in 2-weeks  
3 Lose $10 for sure in 2-weeks  
4 Lose $15 for sure in 2-weeks  
5 Lose $20 for sure in 2-weeks  
6 Lose $25 for sure in 2-weeks  
7 Lose $30 for sure in 2-weeks  
8 Lose $35 for sure in 2-weeks  
9 Lose $40 for sure in 2-weeks  
10 Lose $45 for sure in 2-weeks  
11 Lose $50 for sure in 2-weeks  
12 Lose $55 for sure in 2-weeks  
13 Lose $60 for sure in 2-weeks  
14 Lose $65 for sure in 2-weeks  
15 Lose $70 for sure in 2-weeks  
16 Lose $75 for sure in 2-weeks  
17 Lose $80 for sure in 2-weeks  
18 Lose $85 for sure in 2-weeks  
19 Lose $90 for sure in 2-weeks  
20 Lose $95 for sure in 2-weeks  




Question 1A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $100 with 80% 
chance or $0 with 20% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $100 with 80% chance. 
 
Question 1B.   





Question 1C.  





Question 1D.  






Choice Set 2.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 21 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision 
A   or    B 
1  
 
Lose $100 with 20% chance or lose nothing with 80% 









Lose $0 for sure in 2-weeks  
2 Lose $5 for sure in 2-weeks  
3 Lose $10 for sure in 2-weeks  
4 Lose $15 for sure in 2-weeks  
5 Lose $20 for sure in 2-weeks  
6 Lose $25 for sure in 2-weeks  
7 Lose $30 for sure in 2-weeks  
8 Lose $35 for sure in 2-weeks  
9 Lose $40 for sure in 2-weeks  
10 Lose $45 for sure in 2-weeks  
11 Lose $50 for sure in 2-weeks  
12 Lose $55 for sure in 2-weeks  
13 Lose $60 for sure in 2-weeks  
14 Lose $65 for sure in 2-weeks  
15 Lose $70 for sure in 2-weeks  
16 Lose $75 for sure in 2-weeks  
17 Lose $80 for sure in 2-weeks  
18 Lose $85 for sure in 2-weeks  
19 Lose $90 for sure in 2-weeks  
20 Lose $95 for sure in 2-weeks  




Question 2A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $100 with 20% 
chance or $0 with 80% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $100 with 20% chance. 
 
Question 2B.   





Question 2C.  





Question 2D.  






Choice Set 3.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 9 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision  
A   or   B 
1  
Lose $70 with 80% chance or lose $30 with 20% 
chance in 2-weeks 
 
Lose $30 for sure in 2-weeks  
2 Lose $35 for sure in 2-weeks  
3 Lose $40 for sure in 2-weeks  
4 Lose $45 for sure in 2-weeks  
5 Lose $50 for sure in 2-weeks  
6 Lose $55 for sure in 2-weeks  
7 Lose $60 for sure in 2-weeks  
8 Lose $65 for sure in 2-weeks  
9 Lose $70 for sure in 2-weeks  
 
Question 3A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $70 with 80% 
chance or $30 with 20% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $70 with 80% chance or lose $30 with 20% 
chance. 
 
Question 3B.   





Question 3C.  





Question 3D.  






Choice Set 4.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 9 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision  
A   or   B 
1  
Lose $70 with 20% chance or lose $30 with 80% 
chance in 2-weeks 
 
Lose $30 for sure in 2-weeks  
2 Lose $35 for sure in 2-weeks  
3 Lose $40 for sure in 2-weeks  
4 Lose $45 for sure in 2-weeks  
5 Lose $50 for sure in 2-weeks  
6 Lose $55 for sure in 2-weeks  
7 Lose $60 for sure in 2-weeks  
8 Lose $65 for sure in 2-weeks  
9 Lose $70 for sure in 2-weeks  
 
 
Question 4A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $70 with 20% 
chance or $30 with 80% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $70 with 20% chance or lose $30 with 80% 
chance. 
 
Question 4B.   





Question 4C.  





Question 4D.  









Experiment 1: 2-month Delay Questionnaire 
Instructions: 
 
This is a study in risky decision making.  You will be answering a series of choice questions about 
your preference between a sure and risky loss.  Please note that there are no right or wrong answers.  We are 
only interested in your preferences.  You will be asked 60 questions regarding a choice between two losses.  
You will also be asked a few questions about your feeling regarding the choices you have made.  The whole 
survey should take from 15-30 minutes.   
 
In the questions you’ll be answering Option A will always represent a risky loss while Option B will 
represent a sure loss.   
For example one of your choices could be: 
 
Option A: Lose $90 with 80% chance or $10 with 20% chance vs. 
Option B: Lose $50 for sure  
 
As an incentive to make realistic decisions, we will choose a few of you randomly out of the entire 
pool of participants to receive a monetary reward by actually playing out one of the 60 questions you have 
answered. We will do this by providing you with a base of $100 dollars and then taking away however much is 
decided by your choice.  Then we will pick one of the 60 questions you have answered randomly and proceed to 
play out the choice in front of you. If your choice is the sure loss in that question you’ll simply be paid the 
difference between $100 and the amount you decided to lose for sure. If, on the other hand, you’ve chosen the 
risky option in that question, we will resolve that uncertainty using a random number generator to determine 
your gains.  
 
For instance, in the example above, say you were chosen to play out one choice and we randomly 
selected that choice question to play out.  Then you would get $50 if you chose Option B. If in this particular 
question if you’ve chosen Option A, we will actually play this choice out using a random number generator and 
depending on the outcome you will either lose $90 or $10 and be paid $10 or $90 respectively.   
 
We will contact you if you are one of the few that will actually play out one of your choices and gains 
a monetary reward to come see us in two months (January 25, 2012).  Hence, make your choices as if you 
were losing the money in two months (January 25, 2012).  If you do not want to be contacted please just 
provide us with your name so you can receive your 0.5 bonus marks.  However, if you are interested in having a 










Choice Set 1.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 21 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision 
A   or    B 
1  
 
Lose $100 with 80% chance or lose nothing with 









Lose $0 for sure in 2-months  
2 Lose $5 for sure in 2-months  
3 Lose $10 for sure in 2-months  
4 Lose $15 for sure in 2-months  
5 Lose $20 for sure in 2-months  
6 Lose $25 for sure in 2-months  
7 Lose $30 for sure in 2-months  
8 Lose $35 for sure in 2-months  
9 Lose $40 for sure in 2-months  
10 Lose $45 for sure in 2-months  
11 Lose $50 for sure in 2-months  
12 Lose $55 for sure in 2-months  
13 Lose $60 for sure in 2-months  
14 Lose $65 for sure in 2-months  
15 Lose $70 for sure in 2-months  
16 Lose $75 for sure in 2-months  
17 Lose $80 for sure in 2-months  
18 Lose $85 for sure in 2-months  
19 Lose $90 for sure in 2-months  
20 Lose $95 for sure in 2-months  




Question 1A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $100 with 80% 
chance or $0 with 20% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $100 with 80% chance. 
 
Question 1B.   





Question 1C.  





Question 1D.  






Choice Set 2.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 21 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision 
A   or    B 
1  
 
Lose $100 with 20% chance or lose nothing with 









Lose $0 for sure in 2-months  
2 Lose $5 for sure in 2-months  
3 Lose $10 for sure in 2-months  
4 Lose $15 for sure in 2-months  
5 Lose $20 for sure in 2-months  
6 Lose $25 for sure in 2-months  
7 Lose $30 for sure in 2-months  
8 Lose $35 for sure in 2-months  
9 Lose $40 for sure in 2-months  
10 Lose $45 for sure in 2-months  
11 Lose $50 for sure in 2-months  
12 Lose $55 for sure in 2-months  
13 Lose $60 for sure in 2-months  
14 Lose $65 for sure in 2-months  
15 Lose $70 for sure in 2-months  
16 Lose $75 for sure in 2-months  
17 Lose $80 for sure in 2-months  
18 Lose $85 for sure in 2-months  
19 Lose $90 for sure in 2-months  
20 Lose $95 for sure in 2-months  




Question 2A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $100 with 20% 
chance or $0 with 80% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $100 with 20% chance. 
 
Question 2B.   





Question 2C.  





Question 2D.  






Choice Set 3.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 9 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision  
A   or   B 
1  
Lose $70 with 80% chance or lose $30 with 20% 
chance in 2-months 
 
Lose $30 for sure in 2-months  
2 Lose $35 for sure in 2-months  
3 Lose $40 for sure in 2-months  
4 Lose $45 for sure in 2-months  
5 Lose $50 for sure in 2-months  
6 Lose $55 for sure in 2-months  
7 Lose $60 for sure in 2-months  
8 Lose $65 for sure in 2-months  
9 Lose $70 for sure in 2-months  
 
Question 3A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $70 with 80% 
chance or $30 with 20% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $70 with 80% chance or lose $30 with 20% 
chance. 
 
Question 3B.   





Question 3C.  





Question 3D.  








Choice Set 4.  Please fill in your preferred option between A or B in each of 9 questions. Note that Option A (the risky 
option) is the same in all questions in this set.  
 
 Option A (risky loss) Option B (sure loss) Decision  
A   or   B 
1  
Lose $70 with 20% chance or lose $30 with 80% 
chance in 2-months 
 
Lose $30 for sure in 2-months  
2 Lose $35 for sure in 2-months  
3 Lose $40 for sure in 2-months  
4 Lose $45 for sure in 2-months  
5 Lose $50 for sure in 2-months  
6 Lose $55 for sure in 2-months  
7 Lose $60 for sure in 2-months  
8 Lose $65 for sure in 2-months  
9 Lose $70 for sure in 2-months  
 
 
Question 4A.  
What is the maximum amount you would accept to lose for sure instead of playing out the gamble of losing $70 with 20% 
chance or $30 with 80% chance? 
 
Answer: I would accept to lose maximum $_______ for sure rather than lose $70 with 20% chance or lose $30 with 80% 
chance. 
 
Question 4B.   





Question 4C.  





Question 4D.  















This is a study in risky decision making in the insurance domain.  You will be reading about hypothetical losses 
in car rental for a one day trip.  You will decide on the maximum amount of money you would be willing to 
spend in order to purchase insurance to cover a loss based on varying given scenarios.   There will be a total of 
3 sets of scenarios with each set comprising of 2 parts.  In each set the first part will involve a $200 loss and the 
second part will involve a $2000 loss if the insurance is not purchased.  Varying probabilities corresponding to 
the chance of loss will also be given to aid you in making your decision.  Please note that there are no right or 
wrong answers.  We are only interested in your preferences. 
 
Imagine the following scenarios happening today: 
 
Scenario 1a: You are renting a car for today and are offered a breakdown insurance that will cover an auto 
repair service man coming out to fix your car in the case of an engine malfunction.  Suppose you know from the 
National Motorists Association that there is a 10% chance that the car will breakdown.  If you do not buy the 
insurance and the car breaks down it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 1b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if the car breaks down (the probability remains the 
same). 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 2.1a: You are renting a car for today and know that you must leave some electronic equipment in the 
car.  You are offered a loss prevention insurance that will cover the equipment if it is stolen.  Suppose you know 
from the National Motorists Association that there is a 50% chance that someone will steal the equipment.  If 
you do not buy the insurance and the equipment is stolen it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 2b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if the equipment is stolen (the probability remains 
the same). 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 3.1a: You are renting a car for today and you will be transporting an endangered animal.  Suppose 
that you must have a permit in order to transport the animal or you will incur a fine.  Suppose you know from 
the National Motorists Association that there is a 90% chance that you will be stopped by an authority.  If you 
do not buy the permit and you are stopped it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this permit: ______________ 
 
Scenario 3b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if you are stopped (the probability remains the 
same). 
 









This is a study in risky decision making in the insurance domain.  You will be reading about hypothetical losses 
in car rental for a one day trip.  You will decide on the maximum amount of money you would be willing to 
spend in order to purchase insurance to cover a loss based on varying given scenarios.   There will be a total of 
3 sets of scenarios with each set comprising of 2 parts.  In each set the first part will involve a $200 loss and the 
second part will involve a $2000 loss if the insurance is not purchased.  Varying probabilities corresponding to 
the chance of loss will also be given to aid you in making your decision.  Please note that there are no right or 
wrong answers.  We are only interested in your preferences. 
 
Imagine the following scenarios happening in 2-months: 
 
Scenario 1a: You are renting a car in 2-months and are offered a breakdown insurance that will cover an auto 
repair service man coming out to fix your car in the case of an engine malfunction.  Suppose you know from the 
National Motorists Association that there is a 10% chance that the car will breakdown.  If you do not buy the 
insurance and the car breaks down it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 1b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if the car breaks down (the probability remains the 
same). 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 2.1a: You are renting a car in 2-months and know that you must leave some electronic equipment in 
the car.  You are offered a loss prevention insurance that will cover the equipment if it is stolen.  Suppose you 
know from the National Motorists Association that there is a 50% chance that someone will steal the equipment.  
If you do not buy the insurance and the equipment is stolen it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 2b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if the equipment is stolen (the probability remains 
the same). 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 3.1a: You are renting a car in 2-months and you will be transporting an endangered animal.  Suppose 
that you must have a permit in order to transport the animal or you will incur a fine.  Suppose you know from 
the National Motorists Association that there is a 90% chance that you will be stopped by an authority.  If you 
do not buy the permit and you are stopped it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this permit: ______________ 
 
Scenario 3b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if you are stopped (the probability remains the 
same). 
 









This is a study in risky decision making in the insurance domain.  You will be reading about hypothetical losses 
in car rental for a one day trip.  You will decide on the maximum amount of money you would be willing to 
spend in order to purchase insurance to cover a loss based on varying given scenarios.   There will be a total of 
3 sets of scenarios with each set comprising of 2 parts.  In each set the first part will involve a $200 loss and the 
second part will involve a $2000 loss if the insurance is not purchased.  Varying probabilities corresponding to 
the chance of loss will also be given to aid you in making your decision.  Please note that there are no right or 
wrong answers.  We are only interested in your preferences. 
 
Imagine the following scenarios happening in 1-year: 
 
Scenario 1a: You are renting a car in 1-year and are offered a breakdown insurance that will cover an auto 
repair service man coming out to fix your car in the case of an engine malfunction.  Suppose you know from the 
National Motorists Association that there is a 10% chance that the car will breakdown.  If you do not buy the 
insurance and the car breaks down it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 1b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if the car breaks down (the probability remains the 
same). 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 2.1a: You are renting a car in 1-year and know that you must leave some electronic equipment in the 
car.  You are offered a loss prevention insurance that will cover the equipment if it is stolen.  Suppose you know 
from the National Motorists Association that there is a 50% chance that someone will steal the equipment.  If 
you do not buy the insurance and the equipment is stolen it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 2b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if the equipment is stolen (the probability remains 
the same). 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this insurance: ______________ 
 
Scenario 3.1a: You are renting a car in 1-year and you will be transporting an endangered animal.  Suppose 
that you must have a permit in order to transport the animal or you will incur a fine.  Suppose you know from 
the National Motorists Association that there is a 90% chance that you will be stopped by an authority.  If you 
do not buy the permit and you are stopped it will cost you $200. 
 
What is the maximum amount you will pay for this permit: ______________ 
 
Scenario 3b:  Now suppose instead of $200, it costs $2000 if you are stopped (the probability remains the 
same). 
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